Press & Anor v R.

In self-defence, the jury must determine what occurred and, where necessary, what the defendant honestly believed. A condition such as PTSD may be relevant to whether the defendant genuinely perceived a threat and believed force necessary. It does not displace the objective question whether the force was reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Under section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, an honest and instinctive belief in necessity is strong but not conclusive evidence of reasonable force.

Directions must be read as a whole. A good-character direction was not unfair where its credibility and propensity limbs were clearly given, notwithstanding proper observations on lies and alcohol.

Press & Anor v R. concerned two soldiers convicted at Plymouth Crown Court of causing grievous bodily harm with intent after a violent attack on two Royal Marines outside a burger van. Press had also pleaded guilty to attempted grievous bodily harm with intent. The attack was recorded on CCTV.

Both appellants relied on self-defence. Thompson also relied on evidence that he suffered from PTSD, which he said made him over-sensitive to perceived threats. They appealed against their convictions, alleging deficiencies in directions on lies, good character, joint enterprise, intoxication, PTSD, self-defence and intent. The central issue was whether any alleged misdirection rendered the convictions unsafe.

The appeals were dismissed. The court held that none of the directions, viewed fairly and as a whole, rendered the verdicts unsafe.

1. Joint enterprise. The Recorder correctly directed that a later-formed intention could not establish the joint enterprise alleged. A defendant could, however, be individually guilty if, otherwise than in self-defence, he caused grievous bodily harm with the necessary intent. The verdicts necessarily showed that the jury found a joint enterprise to cause really serious harm. The direction accorded with Grundy and others [1989] 89 Cr App R 333.
2. Self-defence and PTSD. Applying Keane and McGrath [2010] EWCA Crim 2514, the jury had first to decide what happened and then, if the asserted threat had not occurred, whether Thompson genuinely believed it had. PTSD was relevant to whether he honestly perceived a threat and to whether he believed force necessary. The ultimate issue remained objective: whether the force was reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances as he believed them to be. An honest and instinctive belief in necessity was strong, but not conclusive, evidence. The CCTV enabled the jury to assess whether the force was grossly excessive even on Thompson's account.
3. Psychiatric condition. The restrictive rule concerning delusional beliefs in Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245, [2003] QB 1, Canns [2005] EWCA Crim 2264 and Seun Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725 did not govern this case. The expert had not suggested a delusion, but possible hypersensitivity to a perceived threat.
4. Other directions. The lies direction fairly included Thompson's plainly inconsistent interview assertion. The good-character direction properly conveyed both credibility and propensity limbs. The brief intoxication direction was adequate, particularly because Thompson said drink had played no part in his conduct. No separate direction on PTSD and intent was required.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — appeals against conviction dismissed: [2013] EWCA Crim 1849.
2. Plymouth Crown Court — on 26 June 2012, both appellants were convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent; Thompson was also convicted of attempted grievous bodily harm with intent. Press had pleaded guilty to the attempted offence before trial.