Connors & Ors v R.

Sentencing for forced or compulsory labour must reflect the deliberate exploitation of vulnerable people. The court should assess the deception or coercion used, the ensuing control and exploitation, the victims’ vulnerability and harm, the scale and profit of the enterprise, and each offender’s role. The hierarchy between slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour does not create separate sentencing ceilings under Coroners and Justice Act 2009. All forms carry the same statutory maximum, and culpability depends on the circumstances of the offending.

On an Attorney General’s reference, a sentence may be lenient without being so unduly lenient as to justify appellate interference. Proper weight is given to the trial judge’s careful assessment of lengthy and sensitive evidence.

Five members of the Connors family were convicted at Bristol Crown Court, after a three-month trial, of conspiracy to require persons to perform forced or compulsory labour contrary to section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The conspiracy involved recruiting vulnerable and isolated men with false promises of work, accommodation and pay, then exploiting their labour in poor conditions for very low or no pay.

The Attorney General referred the sentences imposed on William, James, John and Miles Connors as unduly lenient. The reference did not challenge the sentence imposed on Mary Brida Connors. The central issue was whether the sentences, although imposed after a careful trial judge’s assessment of individual culpability and mitigation, required intervention as unduly lenient.

1. The court refused leave to refer the sentences of James and Miles Connors. It granted leave in respect of William and John Connors, but declined to interfere with either sentence. Their sentences were lenient, but not so unduly lenient as to require an increase.

2. Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 creates offences encompassing slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. Those forms stand in descending order of gravity, but each has the same maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. The hierarchy therefore does not set separate maxima or dictate sentence. Where other circumstances are similar, slavery will ordinarily be punished more severely than servitude, and servitude more severely than forced labour. The actual sentence depends on culpability, the scale and complexity of the conduct, and profit.

3. Relevant sentencing considerations include the deception or coercion used to recruit workers; subsequent exploitation and control; workplace conditions; the victim’s vulnerability; physical, psychological and financial harm; the organisation’s extent and profit; the number of people exploited; and the individual offender’s role. Deliberately targeting vulnerability aggravates the offence. Sentences must demonstrate that vulnerable victims remain protected by the criminal law and must deter this degrading form of exploitation.

4. The trial judge had carefully addressed those matters, including the defendants’ differing roles, youth, mitigation and the delay not caused by them. The appellate court could not replicate the judge’s assessment after hearing a lengthy trial and vulnerable witnesses. That judicial advantage, coupled with the evident care of the sentencing exercise, meant that no intervention was justified.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The Attorney General’s reference was not acted upon. The court refused leave in respect of James and Miles Connors and, although granting leave in respect of William and John Connors, declined to increase their sentences.
• Bristol Crown Court: Following a three-month trial, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to require persons to perform forced or compulsory labour contrary to section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Sentences were imposed on 19 December 2012.