Case details
Summary
In sentencing grave human-trafficking offending, apparent agreement to travel does not prevent a finding of the highest harm where vulnerable victims were coerced and controlled by threats, debt and rituals, then exposed to sexual exploitation, danger and lasting physical or psychological harm. A leading and organising role, sophisticated planning, influence over others and anticipated substantial financial gain support a finding of the highest culpability.
Sentences for such offending must reflect its gravity and deter others. On an Attorney General's reference, a sentence is unduly lenient if it fails adequately to reflect multiple victims, sustained exploitation and the offender's central role.
Factual background
Following a lengthy trial at Birmingham Crown Court, Josephine Iyamu was convicted of five offences of arranging or facilitating the travel of another person with a view to exploitation, contrary to section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and one offence of perverting the course of justice. She received concurrent terms of 13 years for the trafficking offences and a consecutive year for perverting the course of justice.
The trafficking involved five vulnerable Nigerian women. They were subjected to juju rituals and threats, transported through Libya and Italy, and required to work as prostitutes in Europe to repay asserted debts. The Solicitor General referred the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The central issue was whether the total sentence of 14 years was unduly lenient.
Held
- The reference was allowed. The concurrent sentences for counts 1 to 5 were increased from 13 to 17 years' imprisonment. The consecutive sentence of one year for perverting the course of justice remained. The total sentence was therefore 18 years' imprisonment.
- There was no definitive sentencing guideline under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The court was nevertheless entitled to use the guideline relating to section 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 as interim guidance. It had to recognise that section 59A had been replaced by the 2015 Act and that the maximum sentence had increased from 14 years to life imprisonment.
- The offending fell within the highest culpability category. Iyamu was the directing and organising mind, exercised significant influence within the operation, planned the trafficking with sophistication and expected substantial financial gain.
- The judge was also entitled to find the highest harm. The victims' apparent willingness to travel did not amount to free consent. Their poverty and vulnerability were exploited. They were coerced by threats and juju oaths, kept under psychological control by debts and threats to their families, exposed to a dangerous journey, and sexually exploited. The offending had the hallmarks of servitude rather than merely forced labour.
- The court applied the sentencing observations in Attorney General's Reference Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 2013 (Connors) [2013] EWCA Crim. 324 and the non-exhaustive seriousness factors identified in Attorney General's Reference Nos 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 (Khan and others) [2010] EWCA Crim. 2880. It distinguished Zielinski [2017] EWCA Crim. 758 as substantially less serious.
- Despite the trial judge's careful approach, 13 years for five trafficking counts did not adequately reflect the extreme gravity of the offending. Deterrence required a substantially greater sentence.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the Attorney General's reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, increasing the total sentence from 14 to 18 years' imprisonment: [2018] EWCA Crim 2166.
- Crown Court at Birmingham: Following trial, convicted the offender of five offences under section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and one offence of perverting the course of justice. It imposed a total sentence of 14 years' imprisonment.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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