JC & Ors v R

A juror’s written complaint of prejudice, intimidation or other irregularity does not automatically require the jury’s discharge. The trial judge must give the complaint rapid and close attention and decide, on the particular facts, whether the integrity of the process has been irretrievably damaged or can be protected by a clear direction, warning, or other proportionate step.

On an appeal against conviction, the adequacy and effect of that response are assessed in the light of the trial as a whole, including subsequent conduct and verdicts. Evidence of conduct outside an indictment period may be admissible where it is relevant to a live issue, rather than merely propensity.

Four appellants challenged convictions following a lengthy trial before Judge Kay QC at Luton Crown Court. The prosecution alleged that vulnerable adults had been recruited, controlled by threats and violence, and required to work without payment. The indictment included offences of holding persons in servitude, requiring forced labour, conspiracy, and assault.

During the trial, one juror wrote alleging anti-traveller prejudice and improper pressure by some fellow jurors. The judge declined to discharge the jury or investigate its private deliberations. He instead gave firm directions on impartiality, respectful deliberation, open-mindedness, and the duty to report irregular conduct. The central issue was whether that course rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge handled the juror’s letter impeccably. There was no reason to doubt the safety of the guilty verdicts on the basis of alleged jury bias.

2. A communication alleging jury irregularity requires rapid and close attention. The judge must decide whether the integrity of the trial has been irretrievably damaged or whether it can fairly continue. No response follows automatically. Depending on the facts, the judge may discharge the whole jury, discharge an individual juror, or continue the trial with directions or warnings sufficient to meet the identified problem.

3. The judge was not bound to accept the single juror’s account as requiring discharge. He was entitled to take account of the jury’s attentive conduct, its questions, the absence of earlier concerns, and the fact that the letter followed the defence’s forceful allegation of prejudice. It would also have been inappropriate to investigate the confidential deliberations in the jury room.

4. The renewed directions directly addressed both prejudice against travellers and improper pressure between jurors. No further concern was reported. The later verdicts, which included acquittals, convictions, and failures to reach verdicts, were consistent with conscientious count-by-count consideration rather than blanket prejudice. The approach in R v Smith and Mercieca [2005] 2 Cr. App. R 10 and R v Thompson and Others [2010] 2 Cr. App. R 27 supported that conclusion.

5. The challenged part of the summing up was not a misdirection or unfair attempt to influence the jury. Evidence of pre-indictment ill-treatment was relevant and admissible to test the defence allegation that prosecution witnesses had been induced to make false allegations. There was also sufficient evidence for JC to answer the forced-labour counts: a defendant may participate in the coercive system even where particular work occurs away from the site and outside that defendant’s presence.

6. The remaining applications for leave to appeal against conviction were refused. The sentence applications remained adjourned pending retrials.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2013] EWCA Crim 368, the court dismissed the conviction appeal and refused the remaining applications for leave to appeal against conviction.
• Luton Crown Court: Following trial before Judge Kay QC and a jury, the appellants were convicted on various counts concerning servitude, forced labour and associated offences.