Lodge, R v

Evidence of a witness’s particular disposition may be admissible where it is relevant to a live issue, including an allegation that a complainant was the aggressor. The ordinary rule against leading general good-character evidence merely to bolster credibility remains applicable.

Relevant rebuttal evidence should not be excluded under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 where it bears on a central issue and the jury receive clear directions as to its limited use. An imprudent judicial intervention, or a decision not to repeat evidence fresh in the jury’s minds, will not render a conviction unsafe unless it creates a real risk of improper influence on the verdict.

The appellant was convicted at Inner London Crown Court of inflicting grievous bodily harm and assault by beating following violence in which he claimed to have acted in self-defence. His account alleged racist abuse by the complainant and his companions.

The prosecution recalled the complainant to give evidence of charitable work in Tanzania and produced a photograph of him with a Tanzanian orphan. The appellant contended that this was impermissible good-character evidence and unfairly prejudicial. He also challenged the trial judge’s interventions during the evidence of a defence witness and the absence of a detailed summary of her evidence in the summing up.

The central issues were whether the rebuttal evidence was properly admitted and whether the judge’s conduct created a risk that the convictions were unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held that the convictions were safe.

2. The ordinary evidential rule prevents a party from leading general good-character evidence merely to strengthen its own witness’s credibility. It does not prevent evidence of a witness’s particular disposition being admitted when it is logically relevant to an issue which the jury must decide. The complainant’s alleged use of racist language was integral to the appellant’s self-defence account and to identifying the aggressor. Evidence tending to show the complainant’s contrary disposition was therefore relevant to a central issue, rather than collateral character bolstering.

3. The evidence did not establish that a person well disposed towards black people could never use racist language in the circumstances alleged. That remained an available defence argument. However, the trial judge properly left the evidence to the jury with directions that it could be used only in assessing the allegation of racist conduct, not as general proof of the complainant’s good character. The admission of the evidence caused no unfairness requiring exclusion under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

4. The judge was unwise to tell the defence witness to answer questions “preferably honestly”, since that could imply disbelief. His other interventions were directed to the questions raised by the CCTV evidence and did not display bias. The witness continued to advance her account, but did not confront material inconsistencies between that account and the film.

5. The judge was entitled not to rehearse the witness’s short and recent evidence in the summing up. He had made clear that assessment of reliability and effect was for the jury. A further summary would have highlighted the difficulties in the witness’s account. Neither the interventions, separately or cumulatively, nor the summing up created a risk that the verdicts were unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2013] EWCA Crim 987, dismissed the appeal against conviction.
• Inner London Crown Court — Before HHJ Seed, the appellant was convicted on 5 December 2012 of offences contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. He was sentenced on 18 February 2013.