Parratt, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice & Anor

Article 5(4) requires a speedy review at or about tariff expiry and periodic reviews thereafter at reasonable intervals. The appropriate interval depends on the circumstances of the individual case. Twelve months is a practical starting point, not a legal maximum or presumption. A period exceeding twelve months requires justification, with increasingly cogent reasons as the interval lengthens. The court must reach its own conclusion while giving due weight to the Secretary of State’s expertise. A breach of the review obligation does not itself make continued detention unlawful. Damages are ordinarily unnecessary where a declaration provides just satisfaction. They may be awarded for consequential loss of liberty, diagnosable illness or materially aggravated suffering, but causation must be proved.

The claimant was serving an imprisonment for public protection sentence imposed under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. His tariff expired in January 2010, but his post-tariff Parole Board review was not held until May 2010. The Parole Board admitted liability for that delay. A further challenge concerned the Secretary of State’s decision to allow fifteen months before the next review, which ultimately took place in August 2011 and resulted in the claimant’s release.

The claimant sought declarations and damages for the delay, including alleged delay in transfer to open conditions and release. The issues were whether the claim against the Secretary of State should continue, whether the fifteen-month review period breached Article 5(4), and whether damages were recoverable.

1. First claim. Once the Parole Board had fully admitted liability for the January-to-May 2010 delay, continuing the claim against the Secretary of State would provide no material benefit. The court therefore declined to determine whether the Secretary of State was additionally liable.
2. Review periods. Article 5(4) requires a speedy review at or about tariff expiry and periodic reviews thereafter. The Secretary of State fixes the period before the next review, but judicial review requires the court to reach its own conclusion, while giving due regard to the Secretary of State’s and, where relevant, the Parole Board’s views and expertise. There is no formal twelve-month presumption or maximum. Twelve months is generally a convenient starting point where a prisoner is progressing; a longer period requires justification, and the burden becomes heavier as the period increases.
3. The Secretary of State must normally identify the progress required, allow reasonable time for it to be monitored and reported, and prepare a sensible timetable. The fifteen-month period was justified by the need for transfer to open conditions, testing and consolidation in the community, preparation of release and risk-management plans, and reporting. The claimant’s serious violent offending and the need to demonstrate that release would involve no unacceptable risk were material. The challenge to the fifteen-month period was dismissed.
4. Damages. Applying R (Sturnham) v Parole Board [2012] EWCA Civ 452, a declaration ordinarily provides just satisfaction for Article 5(4) delay. Damages may be appropriate where delay extends detention, causes diagnosable illness, or produces materially aggravated suffering. Delay in transfer to open conditions does not ordinarily justify damages without an additional feature. The alleged earlier release was too uncertain: the claimant had to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that an earlier review would have led to transfer, acceptance of that recommendation, sufficient progress, and earlier release.
5. The claimant failed to prove that the delay caused earlier release to be lost. A declaration was granted for the January-to-May 2010 breach. All other claims, including damages, were dismissed.