Parratt, R (on the application of) v Parole Board

Where a public authority has conceded an Article 5(4) breach and will provide all relief due, a court may refuse to continue an effectively duplicative claim against another public authority. Public interest may nevertheless justify continuation in a fact-specific case. Damages are ordinarily recoverable where the breach probably prolonged detention. The inquiry is a straightforward but for question. An intermediate stage, such as transfer to open conditions, does not itself defeat the claim. Article 5(4) imposes no formal 12-month review benchmark. A longer interval may comply where justified by the prisoner’s progress, testing, reintegration, evidence-gathering and risk.

The appellant was serving an imprisonment for public protection sentence. His tariff expired on 21 January 2010, but his first Parole Board hearing did not take place until 20 May 2010. The Parole Board conceded a breach of Article 5(4), and a declaration was made. A second hearing was held in August 2011, when release was directed.

The Administrative Court, in [2013] EWHC 17 (Admin), rejected a separate claim against the Secretary of State, held that damages for the first delay depended on proof of consequential delay in release, upheld the 15-month interval before the second hearing, and found that earlier release had not been proved. The appeal concerned responsibility for the first delay, damages for consequential detention, the lawfulness of the 15-month interval, and the counterfactual question of earlier release.

1. Duplicative claim. The court upheld the refusal to pursue a separate claim against the Secretary of State. Under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the relevant question was whether further relief was just and appropriate. The declaration against the Parole Board, together with any damages due, provided just satisfaction. There was no practical purpose in obtaining effectively identical relief against the Secretary of State. Arden LJ emphasised that the public interest might justify continuation in another fact-specific case, and that the decision was a case-management discretion with which an appellate court would not lightly interfere.
2. Consequential detention. The court applied the principles stated in Faulkner and Sturnham. A prisoner must prove on the balance of probabilities that the Article 5(4) breach postponed the date of release. The test is a straightforward but for inquiry. The fact that transfer to open conditions or another administrative step intervenes does not create a separate legal obstacle. It may affect the evidential assessment.
3. The evidence established that the appellant would probably have been transferred to open conditions and released three to four months earlier. His courses were complete, reports were positive, conduct was good, and his progress after transfer was sustained. The appeal was therefore allowed to that extent, with damages to be agreed or determined on written submissions.
4. Review interval. Article 5(4) contains no formal 12-month presumption or benchmark. The court must determine the appropriate period in the individual case, while giving due weight to the Secretary of State’s expertise. A period exceeding 12 months requires particular justification. The reasons given for the 15-month interval, including testing and consolidation in open conditions, preparation of release plans, monitoring, reintegration and risk management, were sufficient. The second ground of appeal was dismissed.
5. The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2014] EWCA Civ 1478, the appeal was allowed in part. Damages were awarded for the proved consequential delay in release; the remaining challenges were dismissed.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): In [2013] EWHC 17 (Admin), Males J rejected the separate claim against the Secretary of State, held that damages depended on proof of consequential delay, upheld the 15-month review interval, and found that earlier release had not been established.