Bate, R (On the Application Of) v Parole Board of England And Wales

Article 5(4) requires the Parole Board to review post-tariff detention at reasonable intervals. The Secretary of State’s target date is an important starting point, but the court must decide for itself whether the interval was reasonable. Resource shortages and workload backlogs do not justify unlawful delay. A deferred hearing must be listed consistently with the agreed or clearly understood timetable. A listing policy may give weight to positive prospects of release, provided it complies with Article 5(4) and preserves overall fairness.

Daniel Bate, an IPP prisoner whose tariff expired in 2010, sought judicial review of delay by the Parole Board in reviewing his continued detention. A review scheduled for February 2016 was heard in June 2016 and then deferred. The next oral hearing took place in March 2017, after substantial correspondence and an unsuccessful request for expedition.

He alleged breaches of Article 5(4), systemic failure, an unlawful prioritisation policy and an unlawful refusal to expedite. The central issues were whether the intervals between reviews were reasonable, whether the deferral created an assured timetable, and whether the Board’s listing arrangements unlawfully caused delay.

1. Article 5(4) standard. The Parole Board must review IPP and other indeterminate detention promptly at tariff expiry and thereafter at reasonable intervals. An interval of about a year is likely to be reasonable; where it is substantially longer, the Board must show good reason. The Secretary of State’s target date is entitled to substantial weight, but the court must determine reasonableness for itself.
2. Delay. The June 2016 hearing occurred four months after the target date. The delay was attributable to backlog and shortage of specialist members. Under R (Noorkoiv) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 770, lack of resources could not justify the breach. The claimant received damages for anxiety and frustration, but not delayed-liberty damages for this period.
3. Deferred hearing. The June deferral was justified because further evidence was needed after the claimant’s admission of drug use. It did not justify a nine-month delay. The directions meant that the substantive hearing should be listed in October 2016 or very soon afterwards. The later delay breached Article 5(4), and an earlier hearing would probably have resulted in release. Damages therefore included compensation for anxiety, frustration, distress and delayed liberty.
4. Expedition and policy. The refusal to expedite was wrong because the Board should have considered the timetable and evidence of the claimant’s mental-health difficulties. No separate relief was necessary. The court declined systemic or policy declarations, but held that a policy invariably ignoring the strengths of an individual application might risk Article 5(4) breaches.
5. Outcome. The claim succeeded on ground 1 and ground 4. Damages were to be agreed or assessed through written submissions.