Sean Fitzgerald, R (on the application of) v Parole Board of England and Wales

For a post-tariff lifer, the tariff expiry date is the primary reference point for the Parole Board’s Article 5(4) duty to secure a speedy hearing. The court assesses delay objectively, having regard to the particular circumstances. Administrative difficulties, including insufficient panel-member resources, do not justify a breach.

Where unlawful delay probably caused detention beyond the date on which release would otherwise have occurred, compensatory damages for delayed liberty should ordinarily be awarded. The compensatory award may be a global measure encompassing frustration, anxiety and distress, rather than requiring separate awards for those consequences. A separate failure to prioritise an overdue review may warrant a declaration without additional damages.

The claimant was a post-tariff lifer whose tariff expired on 14 September 2022. His Parole Board review was ready for listing, but an intended hearing was treated as ineffective after an outstanding report was located. The case was not promptly relisted, and a later request for prioritisation was refused. The claimant was eventually heard on 15 August 2023 and released on licence on 7 November 2023.

He sought declarations that the Parole Board had acted unlawfully, compensation under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 for breach of Article 5(4), and other relief. The central issues were whether the delay and refusal to prioritise were unlawful, whether they caused delayed liberty, and the appropriate remedy.

1. Claim allowed. The Parole Board breached the claimant’s Article 5(4) right by failing, after 3 August 2022, to take appropriate steps to secure a timely hearing, and by refusing on 17 October 2022 to prioritise the review.
2. When a post-tariff lifer’s case is referred under section 28(6)(a) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the Parole Board is the Article 5(4) court. The tariff expiry date is the primary reference point. Where possible, a hearing should take place on tariff or shortly afterwards.
3. The question whether delay is unlawful is whether, in the particular circumstances, it deprived the prisoner of a speedy hearing judged by an objective standard of reasonableness. The absence of sufficient panel members is no answer.
4. The hearing should reasonably have been rescheduled by 11 October 2022. On the balance of probabilities, it would then have resulted in a direction for release, but the loss of the original approved-premises bed space caused a further two-month period. The compensable delayed-liberty period was therefore 7 January to 7 November 2023.
5. Compensatory damages of £10,000 were awarded for ten months’ delayed liberty. No additional award was made for frustration, anxiety and distress: the compensatory measure was treated as global and encompassing those losses.
6. Declarations were appropriate. Quashing the prioritisation decision would serve no useful purpose. The Parole Board was not ordered to pay costs, partly because an earlier expedited hearing had been a missed opportunity.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The judgment records that permission had previously been granted by Eyre J on 10 February 2023 and that the claim was transferred from Birmingham to London for an expedited substantive hearing, which did not occur before the claimant’s release.