Attfield, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Barnet

The power to charge for residents’ parking permits under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 must be exercised for the statutory purposes of traffic management and the provision of suitable parking facilities. It cannot be used primarily or secondarily to raise surplus revenue for wider transport expenditure. The fact that a surplus may later be applied under section 55 does not enlarge the purpose for which charges may be imposed under section 45. Charges need not be limited to the immediate operating costs of a parking scheme. They may reflect legitimate parking policies, including demand management, but the charging decision must not be made to generate section 55 surplus revenue for other purposes.

The claimant sought judicial review of Barnet’s decision to increase residents’ parking permit and visitor voucher charges. The increases were intended to generate additional income which would produce a surplus in the Special Parking Account and support expenditure on road maintenance, highway improvement, concessionary fares and other transport costs.

The claimant argued that this purpose exceeded the powers conferred by sections 45 and 122 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Permission had been granted on that ground alone. The central issue was whether the statutory charging power could be used to raise revenue for transport purposes beyond the operation and management of parking schemes.

1. The claim succeeded. Barnet’s purpose in increasing the charges was to generate additional income for wider transport expenditure and to transfer the resulting surplus from the Special Parking Account to the General Fund. That was an unauthorised purpose.
2. A public body must exercise a statutory power only for the purpose for which Parliament conferred it. Where authorised and unauthorised purposes coexist, the authorised purpose must be dominant. The statutory purpose is identified by interpreting the language of the enactment in its context, as explained in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 and R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349.
3. Sections 45(2)(b), 55 and 122 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 must be read together. Section 55 permits an existing surplus to be applied to specified transport and highway purposes, but it does not authorise a council to set parking charges in order deliberately to create such a surplus. The Act is not a fiscal or taxing measure.
4. The authority is not confined to charges which merely recover the base operating costs of a parking scheme. Charges may be set to pursue lawful parking-management objectives, such as rationing demand, encouraging off-street parking and balancing the interests of different users. However, they cannot be introduced or increased for the purpose, primary or secondary, of raising section 55(4) revenue.
5. The reasoning in Cran v Camden LBC [1995] RTR 346 was accepted. Djanogly v Westminster City Council [2011] RTR 9 was explained consistently with that approach. The claim was therefore allowed and the impugned decision was unlawful.

Court of Appeal: Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on the statutory-powers ground by order dated 24 April 2012. Permission was refused on the grounds alleging inadequate or irrational reasons and irrationality of the decision.

High Court (Administrative Court): The claim was allowed on the statutory-powers ground.