Daniel Adams v North Somerset Council

Under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, a traffic regulation order made under section 32 falls within Part VI of Schedule 9 even if other powers are cited, and its validity must be challenged by statutory review. The statutory publication-and-objection procedure under the 1996 Regulations is not a Gunning consultation: it may follow an in-principle decision, but duly made objections must be conscientiously considered and the authority must remain open to modification. Parking charges may fund management and maintenance of off-street car parks, but may not be imposed principally to raise general revenue. Section 122 imposes a qualified balancing duty. The public sector equality duty requires reasonable inquiry and due regard, not a prescribed equality-impact procedure. A procedural breach warrants quashing only where the applicant’s interests were substantially prejudiced.

The claimant, the manager of a retail business in Clevedon, challenged North Somerset Council’s decision to make a traffic regulation order introducing charges at three off-street car parks. The claim was initially brought as judicial review. An order dated 10 April 2026 directed that it proceed as a statutory review under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.

The claimant alleged improper purpose, breach of the Council’s section 122 duties, defective consultation, inadequate assessment of parking displacement, breach of the public sector equality duty, irrational weighting of planning and community considerations, and failure to demonstrate maintenance needs. The Council accepted that two objections submitted by the claimant had not been considered because of an administrative filing error. The central issues were whether statutory review was the exclusive procedure, whether the statutory process engaged the Gunning principles, and whether the procedural breach caused substantial prejudice.

1. Procedure. The order expressly relied on section 32 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. It was therefore an order to which Part VI of Schedule 9 applied. Statutory review was the exclusive means of challenging the validity of any provision in the order, notwithstanding that other statutory powers were also cited.
2. Purpose and section 122. The power to impose off-street parking charges was not a general revenue-raising power. Applying R (Attfield) v London Borough of Barnet [2013] EWHC 2089 (Admin) and Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1980] AC 1148, the relevant authorised purpose had to be dominant where another purpose was alleged. Making the car parks self-financing and funding their management and maintenance was a proper purpose. The evidence did not establish an intention to generate surplus for unrelated transport expenditure. Ground 1 failed.
3. Section 122 imposed a qualified duty requiring the Council to balance traffic movement, parking provision, local amenities and other relevant matters. The traffic-movement duty had no primacy. The Council had performed the required evaluative exercise, including consideration of displacement, air quality and accessibility.
4. Consultation. The publication and objection regime in the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 was not consultation in the Gunning sense. The statutory scheme envisaged an in-principle decision followed by publication of the proposed order and consideration of objections. The Council had published the prescribed material and its reasons were adequate. It was not required to summarise other documents available on its website. However, it breached regulation 13(a) by failing to consider the claimant’s two duly submitted objections.
5. The displacement evidence, including traffic monitoring, turnover and capacity data, planned review and possible mitigation, was not irrationally or procedurally inadequate. The Council’s equality assessments and measures for disabled users demonstrated reasonable inquiry and due regard under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. Low income, vulnerability and digital exclusion were not protected characteristics in themselves. The Council was entitled to attach the weight it did to the relevant considerations, and the maintenance evidence did not undermine its conclusion that the car parks should be self-financing.
6. Relief. Under paragraph 36 of Schedule 9, a breach of a relevant requirement did not justify quashing unless the claimant’s interests had been substantially prejudiced. The claimant had participated in the earlier non-statutory consultation, and the court concluded that the Council would have made the order without modification even if his objections had been considered. The claim was dismissed. No quashing order was made and the TRO remained valid.

The claim was initially brought as judicial review. On 10 April 2026 HHJ Jarman KC directed that it proceed as a statutory review under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. No appellate decision is stated.