Trail Riders Fellowship v Hampshire County Council

A traffic regulation order may be made where the authority is satisfied that it is expedient for one or more statutory purposes under Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, even if the decision documents do not identify the relevant subsections expressly. The authority must perform the qualified duty under section 122 by balancing traffic movement, including pedestrians, against the matters in section 122(2) and the statutory purposes for the order. Compliance is substantive: express reference to section 122 is unnecessary where the decision and the decision-maker’s expertise show that the balancing exercise was undertaken. A statement of reasons is adequate if it enables informed consultation and explains the principal issues. Quashing requires substantial prejudice.

The claimant challenged the Council’s decision to make an order prohibiting mechanically propelled vehicles from three rural green lanes, subject to access. The challenge was brought under Part VI of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The claimant alleged that the order lacked a statutory purpose, failed to comply with section 122, was supported by inadequate reasons, breached procedural requirements, failed properly to consider representations and was irrational in rejecting a permit system.

The central issues were whether the Council had lawfully exercised its statutory powers, whether its consultation and reasons were adequate, whether the police consultation had been properly considered, and whether a total prohibition was irrational.

1. The claim was dismissed. None of the grounds established that the order was outside the Council’s powers or that a relevant statutory requirement had caused substantial prejudice.
2. The reasons given for the order corresponded to several statutory purposes in section 1(1), including preventing danger and damage, facilitating traffic and preventing unsuitable vehicular use. Express identification of the relevant paragraphs was unnecessary.
3. Section 122 imposed a qualified duty. The duty to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of vehicular traffic and pedestrians did not have primacy over the matters in section 122(2). The authority had to conduct the necessary balancing exercise.
4. Compliance depended on substance rather than express citation. The Statement of Reasons, officer’s report and decision letter addressed pedestrians, access, amenity, safety and continued vehicular use. The decision-maker’s expertise supported the inference that the duty was performed.
5. The Statement of Reasons enabled consultees to understand the proposal and make informed representations. The claimant understood the proposal and had not suffered substantial prejudice.
6. The omission of the Roads Policing Unit’s response from the officer’s report was a shortcoming, but did not warrant quashing.
7. The Council had considered a permit system and was entitled to conclude that a total prohibition was effective. The high threshold for irrationality was not met.