Lord Hanningfield of Chelmsford v Chief Constable of Essex Police

[2013] EWHC 243 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2013] EWHC 243 (QB) · [2013] 1 WLR 3632 · [2013] CN 254
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
15 February 2013
Judgment text

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Subjects
Public law Human rights Police powers of arrest and search
Keywords
unlawful arrest search without warrant necessity of arrest voluntary interview Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 custody officer continued detention damages
Outcome
claim succeeded
Judicial consideration

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Summary

The statutory power to search premises after an arrest does not depend on the arrested person being considered dangerous. It requires a lawful arrest away from a police station for an indictable offence, together with reasonable grounds for believing that relevant evidence is on the premises. Arrest without warrant requires both an actual belief that arrest is necessary for a statutory purpose and objective grounds making that belief reasonable. Officers must genuinely consider practicable alternatives, including voluntary attendance. Convenience or theoretical risks are insufficient to bypass ordinary warrant safeguards. A custody officer’s later reasons cannot cure an unlawful arrest.

Factual background

The claimant sought damages for his arrest at home, the search of his bungalow without a warrant, and his subsequent detention at a police station. Essex Police were investigating alleged fraud concerning expenses incurred while he led Essex County Council. The police relied on Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, particularly the arrest and search powers in sections 24 and 32, and on section 37 for continued detention. The central issues were whether the arrest was necessary, whether the search was lawful, and whether the custody officer’s authorisation independently made the detention lawful.

Held

  1. The search power in section 32(2)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was not confined to cases where there were reasonable grounds for believing that the arrested person presented a danger. Section 32(1) addressed personal searches on that basis, whereas section 32(2) supplied additional powers. The search was therefore not unlawful merely because the claimant was not perceived to be dangerous.

  2. The arrest nevertheless had to satisfy section 24. The applicable two-stage test, identified in Hayes v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2012] 1 WLR 517, required the officer actually to believe that arrest was necessary for a reason specified in section 24(5), and that belief objectively to be reasonable in the light of the facts known to the officer.

  3. The officer had to consider whether voluntary attendance was a practicable alternative. That consideration was substantive rather than a matter of box-ticking. The court was required to allow room for operational judgment, but the absence of urgency or danger did not remove the need for an objective assessment.

  4. The statutory necessity requirement was not met. The asserted risks of destruction of evidence, inappropriate contact and non-cooperation were speculative. The claimant’s previous cooperation and the absence of solid grounds for rejecting voluntary procedures meant that the arrest could not rationally be justified merely to avoid obtaining a search warrant. The arrest was unlawful, and the consequential search under section 32(2)(b) was unlawful.

  5. The subsequent detention was also unlawful. The custody officer’s decision under section 37 was separate, but it could not cure the defect in the original arrest, consistently with Richardson v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2011] 2 Cr App R 1. Compensation for the arrest, search and detention was to be assessed on the conventional scale, with the amount to be agreed.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

First-instance decision. The judgment does not state any earlier appellate stage.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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