R (oao TL) v Surrey Police

An arrest under section 24(5)(e) of the PACE 1984 requires both an honest belief that arrest is necessary for an identified statutory purpose and reasonable grounds for that belief, assessed by reference to information known at the time. Necessity means more than desirability or convenience. The court must examine the actual reasons relied upon and may not combine individually unlawful reasons into a lawful justification.

Arrest may in principle be necessary to protect a witness through specific bail conditions, or to facilitate a prompt and effective investigation involving a search. But those possibilities require reasonable, case-specific grounds. Where voluntary interview is practicable, and a search warrant under section 8 is reasonably available, arrest is not justified merely for operational convenience.

The claimant sought judicial review of his arrest by Surrey Police while attending a police station for a pre-arranged voluntary interview concerning historic allegations of rape and sexual assault. The police also intended to search his home and impose bail conditions restricting contact with the complainant.

The claimant argued that the arrest was unnecessary under section 24(5)(e) of the PACE 1984, and that the stated purposes were collateral or unsupported by reasonable grounds. The defendant relied on the need for interview, witness protection and a search under section 18. The central issues were the proper standard of review and whether any of those purposes lawfully justified arrest.

1. Permission and judicial review. The factual disputes were capable of fair resolution in judicial review proceedings and did not require a private law forum. Permission was granted.
2. Applicable test. Under section 24(5) of the PACE 1984, the arresting officer must honestly believe that arrest is necessary for an identified statutory reason. The decision must also have been based on reasonable grounds, objectively assessed by the court using the information known to the officer at the time. Necessity is not synonymous with convenience or desirability. The court reviews the particular decision-maker’s reasons, rather than asking whether any police officer could rationally have reached the decision.
3. Interview. The claimant had repeatedly indicated that he would attend voluntarily, and the officer had not said that he doubted that assurance. Arrest was therefore not reasonably necessary merely to obtain an interview. The fact that the officer later informed the claimant’s solicitor that arrest would occur could not retrospectively establish necessity.
4. Bail conditions and witness protection. The imposition of specific bail conditions could in principle conduce to a prompt and effective investigation where reasonable grounds existed for believing that they were necessary to protect a witness from intimidation. In this case, however, the decision was based on general policy rather than an individual assessment. There were no reasonable grounds for believing that arrest was necessary for that purpose. Section 24(5)(d) could not be invoked retrospectively, and the evidence did not show that its requirements would inevitably have been met.
5. Search. The court declined to resolve the broader question whether section 18 considerations could ever be the sole justification for arrest under section 24(5)(e). On the facts, the officers lacked reasonable grounds for arresting the claimant to use section 18 rather than seeking a warrant under section 8. The investigation was not sufficiently urgent, and the officers had not addressed the risk during the period required to obtain a warrant.
6. Disposition. None of the three stated reasons lawfully justified arrest. The arrest, consequent bail conditions and search were declared unlawful and quashed. The defendant was ordered to pay costs, with an interim payment of £15,000. The damages claim was adjourned for assessment by a Master of the Queen’s Bench Division.

First-instance judicial review in the Divisional Court of the High Court. The claim was upheld and declaratory and quashing relief granted.