Truro City Council v Cornwall City Council

Under section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, the Development Plan is the starting point and has statutory priority. A planning authority may depart from it where material considerations clearly indicate that it should not be followed. The authority must identify the relevant policies, assess conformity, identify material considerations and explain the weight given to them. The required degree of detail varies with the case.

Summary reasons for granting permission may be brief where members adopt a detailed officer report. They need not repeat every issue or provide reasons for reasons. Prematurity depends on whether the development would predetermine or pre-empt decisions properly left to the plan-making process. Affordable housing policies must be applied according to their ordinary wording and geographical scope.

The claimant sought judicial review of planning permission granted by the defendant for a major mixed-use development on a greenfield site east of Truro. The scheme included park and ride, retail, waste and recycling facilities, an energy centre and 97 dwellings.

The challenge alleged failures concerning the statutory Development Plan duty, adequacy of reasons, prematurity, later material considerations, the retail sequential test and disaggregation, and the applicable affordable housing policy. The central questions were whether the defendant had lawfully balanced the Development Plan against other material considerations and whether it had properly addressed the planning issues raised.

1. Ground one failed. The defendant treated the Development Plan as the starting point and recognised that the proposal departed from it. Reading the reports as a whole, the authority identified the relevant policies, considered the proposal’s conformity, identified contrary considerations, and attributed substantial weight to transportation, waste, housing and other benefits. Those considerations were found to outweigh the statutory priority of the Development Plan. Section 38(6) does not require every policy to be analysed separately with an account of every change making it outdated. The necessary degree of particularity varies by case.
2. Ground two failed. The summary reasons in the decision notice were adequate in context. The members followed detailed officer reports and there was no indication that they rejected the reasoning supporting the recommendation. The notice did not need to repeat every issue, explain the absence of prematurity, or give reasons for reasons. The policies were sufficiently identified by being listed with their titles. Any deficiency would not have caused substantial prejudice and could have been remedied by mandatory relief rather than quashing.
3. Ground three failed. Prematurity concerns whether a proposal predetermines or pre-empts a decision which ought to be taken through the Development Plan process, having regard to its scale, location and nature, or creates a real risk of doing so. The emerging Core Strategy and Neighbourhood Plan were embryonic, contained no relevant site allocations, and could not be shown to be prejudiced. The issue was a matter of planning judgment, and the authority’s conclusion was neither irrational nor legally flawed.
4. Ground four failed. Under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, a delegated officer must refer an application back where a new material consideration has arisen. No material progress in the plans required reconsideration. The Langarth Farm retail effects had already been considered, and the affordable housing policy document relied on had been abandoned.
5. Grounds five and six failed. The committee was entitled to conclude that Pydar Street was not an available sequentially preferable site and, on the reviewed evidence, that disaggregation of the retail elements was unrealistic. Policy BHM4 applied to rural villages within defined settlement boundaries, not merely to land with a rural character on the urban fringe. Applying the urban policy was a reasonable planning judgment. The claim was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review decision. Permission to bring the claim was granted on the papers by Collins J on 6 March 2013. The claim was dismissed by the Administrative Court.