Woodcock Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Anor

Where a local planning authority cannot demonstrate a five-year housing land supply, paragraph 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework applies to relevant housing-supply policies in emerging development plans, including draft neighbourhood plans. Those policies must be treated as out of date, although the decision-maker must assess the weight they deserve in the circumstances. A prematurity objection requires more than showing that an emerging plan is at an advanced stage. The decision-maker must identify whether permission would predetermine matters central to the plan and whether the resulting adverse impacts would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits. When assessing an emerging plan under paragraph 216, all three stated criteria must be considered and, where they raise important issues, addressed by reasons.

The claimant challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 the Secretary of State’s dismissal of its appeal against refusal of outline permission for 120 dwellings and associated uses at Sayers Common.

The Inspector recommended permission, finding the site sustainable, the infrastructure adequate and the development acceptable. The Secretary of State agreed with those merits findings but dismissed the appeal because the proposal conflicted with, and was premature in relation to, an emerging neighbourhood plan. The issues included the meaning and weight of the draft plan, the effect of the five-year housing-land-supply shortfall, and the application of national policy on prematurity.

1. Grounds 1–4 succeeded. The Secretary of State’s decision dated 4 September 2014 was quashed under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

2. Paragraph 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework applies to relevant housing-supply policies in a draft development plan, including a draft neighbourhood plan. Where a five-year housing-land supply cannot be demonstrated, those policies are treated as out of date and the presumption in paragraph 14 is engaged. The decision-maker must nevertheless determine the weight to be given to the policies by considering the reasons for the shortfall and other relevant circumstances.

3. The Secretary of State unlawfully treated the absence of an up-to-date objective assessment of housing need as a factor increasing the weight given to the draft neighbourhood plan. He also failed to address the claimant’s substantial contention that the proposed 30–40 dwelling limit for Sayers Common should not operate as a cap in the absence of such an assessment.

4. The Secretary of State had to weigh the conflict arising from the proposed scale of development against his own findings that the site was sustainable, the scale and density were acceptable, and infrastructure constraints would be overcome. He failed to perform that exercise.

5. The Planning Practice Guidance required consideration of whether granting permission would predetermine decisions about the scale, location or phasing of development central to the emerging plan, and whether any adverse impacts would clearly and significantly outweigh the benefits. The decision letter did not apply those criteria. The limited statutory remit of a neighbourhood-plan examination also meant that prematurity could not be assumed in relation to matters outside the examination’s “basic conditions”.

6. Paragraph 216 required consideration of the plan’s stage of preparation, unresolved objections and consistency with the National Planning Policy Framework. Those criteria were important issues on the material before the Secretary of State, but the decision letter gave no reasons addressing them.

First-instance judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The Secretary of State’s decision dismissing the planning appeal was quashed.