S, R (On the Application Of) v The General Teaching Council for England & Anor

A court retains an independent discretion to hand down a reserved judgment even after the parties have settled and jointly request that it remain unpublished. The parties’ wishes are relevant but are not decisive, because public policy may require the judgment to become a matter of public record. The discretion applies in judicial review proceedings, where statutory construction or public policy issues may have wider significance. The provision of a draft judgment is intended to facilitate orderly consideration of consequential matters, not to provide a staging post for settlement or a means by which a powerful party may suppress an adverse ruling. The court must balance the wider public interest against the parties’ individual interests, including the position of an unrepresented litigant in person.

The claimant challenged decisions concerning her compulsory induction as a newly qualified teacher under the Education (Induction Arrangements for School Teachers) (England) Regulations 2008. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on two issues by Langstaff J and, on renewal, by Lindblom J. After the substantive hearing, the judge prepared a draft judgment indicating that the claimant should succeed and that the matter should be remitted.

The parties then reached a proposed settlement conditional on the judgment not being handed down. The central issue was whether the court should exercise its discretion to withhold the final judgment despite the parties’ agreement.

1. The court had an independent discretion whether to hand down the reserved judgment notwithstanding the parties’ settlement and joint request that it should not be handed down. The discretion arose in judicial review proceedings as well as in private litigation. The governing approach was identified in Prudential Assurance Company v McBains Cooper and others [2000] 1 WLR 2000.

2. Public policy prevented the parties from making the court’s decision not to hand down the judgment an enforceable condition of their compromise. The parties’ wishes were a factor, but not an overriding factor. In an Administrative Court case involving statutory interpretation or policy, the potential value of the judgment as a public record could justify giving it greater weight.

3. The circulation of a draft judgment served an orderly procedural purpose. It enabled the parties to consider consequential orders and allowed the formal delivery process to be abbreviated. It was not simply a staging post towards settlement. The judge relied on the discussion in F&C Alternative Investment Holdings Ltd v Barthelemy, etc [2011] EWHC 1851 (Ch).

4. On the facts, the judge balanced the potential wider value of promulgating the judgment against the personal interests of the unrepresented claimant, who wished to secure a further opportunity to complete her induction satisfactorily. He gave greater weight to those personal interests and decided, with considerable misgivings, not to hand down the judgment.

5. The judge was doubtful that the proposed consent order could properly contain the substantive terms in the form submitted. The parties therefore accepted an order in traditional Tomlin form, providing for quashing and remission of the decision, extension of the claimant’s induction period, restrictions on the material to be considered, and no order as to costs. The draft judgment was not to be disclosed beyond those to whom it had already been disclosed.

The judgment describes the earlier permission stages but is itself a first-instance ruling on the handling of the reserved judgment.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Langstaff J granted permission on the principal issue. Lindblom J granted permission on the second issue on oral renewal.
• High Court (Administrative Court): the substantive claim was settled after a draft judgment indicating that the claimant should succeed. The court declined to hand down the judgment and made an agreed order in Tomlin form.