NEHA BERIWALA v WOODSTONE PROPERTIES (BIRMINGHAM) LIMITED & Anor

Where parties settle after receiving a draft judgment, the judge retains discretion to hand down the judgment. The court must balance the parties’ wishes and private interests against the public interest in publication. Supplying a draft judgment is a relevant, and potentially strong, factor in favour of handing it down, but it creates no presumption and is not decisive. Public interest may favour publication where the case raises issues of general legal importance, exposes wrongdoing, vindicates witnesses, or provides guidance beyond the parties. Conversely, avoiding further litigation and conserving scarce court resources are themselves public interest considerations. A judgment should generally not be handed down where the dispute is private, largely factual, of limited wider significance, and settlement is likely to prevent further litigation.

The claimant brought a commercial claim concerning loans and the circumstances in which shares were to be transferred between the parties. After a five-day trial, the judge prepared and circulated a draft judgment to the parties for corrections. The parties then settled all outstanding disputes by a Tomlin order, conditional on the judgment not being handed down.

The court therefore considered whether, despite the settlement and the parties’ joint request, the draft judgment should be handed down. The central issue was how to balance the public interest in publication against the parties’ wishes, the private nature of the dispute, the stage reached in preparing the judgment, and the prospect of further litigation.

1. Disposition. The court declined to hand down the original judgment and approved the updated Tomlin order.
2. The court retained a discretion to hand down judgment notwithstanding settlement, even where the parties had received the draft judgment. The applicable approach was to weigh all relevant circumstances, including the private interests of the parties and any public interest in publication. The same test applied whether settlement occurred before or after circulation of the draft judgment.
3. The purposes of circulating a draft judgment under Practice Direction 40E were to allow consideration of consequential orders and correction of typographical or obvious errors. Circulation was not intended to facilitate settlement discussions. Nevertheless, circulation was a relevant factor in deciding whether to proceed, and could be a strong factor where the parties settled in light of the judgment. It was not decisive and did not create a presumption that judgment should be handed down.
4. Public interest factors potentially favouring publication included a point of law of general interest, appellate disagreement, exposure of wrongdoing, vindication of witnesses, regulatory concerns, or guidance likely to assist others. The court also treated the avoidance of further litigation and expenditure of court resources as a public interest consideration, not merely a private benefit.
5. Here, the draft judgment’s limited point concerning Quistclose trusts was unlikely to have wider significance. The dispute was private and commercial, the judgment was predominantly factual, there were no allegations of dishonesty or conduct requiring public exposure, and settlement was likely to avoid further financially significant litigation. Those considerations, together with the parties’ wishes, outweighed publication.

First instance decision. The judgment was not handed down on the merits because the parties settled and the court approved a Tomlin order.