Lloyd & Anor v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

A challenge under Town and Country Planning Act 1992 section 288 is akin to judicial review and concerns errors of law, not the merits of an Inspector’s planning judgment. A mobile home or caravan is temporary residential accommodation and is not an existing permanent dwelling for the purpose of policies permitting replacement dwellings. A policy treating caravans as residential buildings for assessing their impact does not require a caravan to be treated as a house when considering its replacement. The impact of the proposed development must be assessed first. Any lawful fallback position is then considered as a possible very special circumstance. Inspector decisions on fact-sensitive planning matters do not constitute binding precedents.

The claimants challenged an Inspector’s dismissal of their appeal against refusal of planning permission to retain an altered log cabin at a rural site in the Green Belt. They had previously occupied a caravan under a certificate of lawful use and argued that, if permission for the log cabin were refused, they could lawfully return a mobile home to the site. They contended that the mobile home could be treated as an existing dwelling or residential building under the local policies and that the fallback position would cause greater harm to the Green Belt. The issues were whether the proposal was inappropriate development, whether the Inspector properly assessed openness, character and appearance, the fallback position and very special circumstances, and whether adequate reasons were given.

1. The claim was dismissed. A challenge under Town and Country Planning Act 1992 section 288 is akin to judicial review. It lies for an error of law or relevant procedural failure causing substantial prejudice, and does not permit the court to substitute its own planning judgment.
2. The Inspector correctly treated the proposed permanent log cabin as inappropriate development in the Green Belt. Under Policy 23, an existing dwelling meant a permanent house or building. A caravan or mobile home was temporary residential accommodation, even if the lawful use of the land was permanent and the occupier intended to remain there.
3. Policy 26, which required residential caravans and mobile homes to be treated as residential buildings, concerned the assessment of their impact. It did not convert an existing mobile home into a house for the purposes of Policy 23, particularly where Policy 23 expressly excluded temporary residential accommodation.
4. The Inspector was entitled to assess the proposal on its own merits when considering openness, and then consider the lawful mobile-home fallback as an other consideration relevant to very special circumstances. This approach was consistent with Brentwood DC v SSE and Gray (1996) 72 P&CR 61.
5. The Inspector’s findings that the log cabin had a reasonable appearance but was unduly prominent were not inconsistent. Prominence and appearance were distinct aspects of its impact on character and appearance. The Inspector was also entitled to assume that the other buildings would remain in the fallback position because there was no evidence that they would be removed.
6. The reasons were sufficient under Clarke Homes v SoS (1993) 66 P&CR 263. The decision made clear what issues had been considered and why the appeal failed. The Inspector’s interpretation of the planning policies was a matter of law for the court, in accordance with Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee CC [2012] UKSC 13, but involved no error of law.
7. Earlier Inspector decisions permitting replacement of mobile homes by permanent buildings were not binding precedents, particularly because they did not concern Green Belt land. Permission to appeal was refused because the proposed grounds had no real prospect of success.

The judgment describes a challenge to an Inspector’s decision dated 2 August 2012, which had dismissed the claimants’ appeal against the Council’s refusal of planning permission. The High Court dismissed the section 288 claim and refused permission to appeal.