Lloyd & Anor v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government & Anor

In Green Belt planning policy, a mobile home is not a building merely because it is lawfully stationed for residential use. The exception for replacement buildings therefore does not permit replacement of a mobile home by a permanent house.

National and local policies must be read in their statutory and policy context. References to construction, rebuilding, houses and buildings point to permanent structures. A policy requiring residential caravans and mobile homes to receive similar treatment in most circumstances does not override a specific exclusion for replacement of temporary residential accommodation.

Earlier planning appeals are not binding precedents, particularly where they concern different policies or non-Green Belt land. The appropriate route for an exceptional proposal remains reliance on very special circumstances.

The appellants challenged the refusal of planning permission to retain a Canadian log cabin in the Green Belt. The cabin had replaced a mobile home, and a lawful development certificate permitted the stationing of a mobile home for residential use on the site.

The Inspector treated the cabin as inappropriate Green Belt development and rejected the appeal. The High Court dismissed the appellants’ application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990: [2013] EWHC 3076 (Admin).

The Court of Appeal considered whether the National Planning Policy Framework and the Local Plan permitted a permanent dwelling to replace a lawfully stationable mobile home, and whether contrary Inspector decisions affected that conclusion.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Sullivan delivered the leading judgment. Lord Justice Patten and the Master of the Rolls agreed. The Inspector and the judge were correct to conclude that the proposal was inappropriate Green Belt development.
2. The statutory context was important. The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 distinguishes operational development, including building operations, from development consisting of a material change of use. Section 55(1A)(b) includes rebuilding within building operations. The Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, as extended by section 13 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968, treats a mobile home as a moveable caravan. Stationing it on land is a use of land, not a building operation: Wealden District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1988) 56 P&CR 286.
3. In Policy 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework, “building” bears its ordinary and natural meaning. It refers to something constructed on the site and does not include a moveable structure stationed there. The Local Plan had to be read similarly. Policy 4 establishes the starting presumption against new buildings in the Green Belt, while Policies 22 and 23 refer to extensions or replacements of existing houses and buildings. Their references to the original dwelling remaining “as built”, rebuilding and the resulting building’s size confirm that mobile homes are outside those provisions.
4. Policy 26, which provides for similar treatment of residential caravans and mobile homes in most circumstances, does not override the specific exclusion in Policy 23 of replacements for temporary residential accommodation. A lawful permanent use of land does not make the mobile-home accommodation permanent. The structure remains moveable, constructed from relatively short-life materials and capable of being removed. Earlier Inspector decisions did not bind the decision-maker, and non-Green Belt decisions concerned different policy contexts.
5. The court noted that an appellant may rely on the strength of a fallback position, together with other considerations, as constituting very special circumstances. That issue was outside the permission to appeal, and the Inspector’s conclusion that such circumstances did not exist was not challenged. The appeal was dismissed with costs. Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.

1. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court. His Honour Judge David Cooke dismissed the appellants’ application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 challenging the Inspector’s decision: [2013] EWHC 3076 (Admin).
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The court dismissed the appeal with costs and refused permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.