Arshad v Court of Magistrates Malta

Under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, extradition may be unjust or oppressive where the requested person’s physical or mental condition creates a sufficiently serious combination of illness, suicide risk, unfitness to plead, treatment needs and prognosis. The court must assess the circumstances at the time of the extradition hearing, including whether continued treatment may materially improve the position. Where the condition is presently oppressive but may improve within a reasonable period, adjournment is generally preferable to discharge. In European Union extradition cases, mutual trust ordinarily supports a presumption that the requesting state will provide appropriate care and suicide-prevention measures. Article 3 evidence must be clear and cogent to displace that presumption. Article 8 does not make extradition disproportionate merely because separation affects a vulnerable person and a dependent family member.

Mohammed Arshad appealed against District Judge Purdy’s order of 2 January 2013 directing his extradition to Malta under a European Arrest Warrant to stand trial for alleged involvement in importing cannabis. The appeal concerned his deteriorating mental health, suicide risk, fitness to plead, the adequacy of psychiatric and prison conditions in Malta, and the effect of extradition on his relationship with his mother.

The appeal was adjourned for further medical evidence. By the resumed hearing, the appellant was compulsorily detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983, was assessed as suffering severe mental illness, was unfit to plead, and presented a high suicide risk. The central issue was whether extradition was unjust or oppressive under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, and if so whether the proceedings should be adjourned or the appellant discharged.

1. Appeal allowed in part and proceedings adjourned. The court differed from the district judge and adjourned the extradition under section 25(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003. The appellant’s severe mental illness, high suicide risk, unfitness to plead, compulsory hospital treatment and uncertain but potentially improvable prognosis made extradition presently oppressive.
2. The statutory question requires an overall judgment on the evidence at the time of the extradition hearing. The court must consider the person’s mental condition, the connection between that condition and the risk of suicide, the likely effect of extradition, available preventative measures, treatment needs and prognosis. The high threshold identified in Republic of South Africa v Dewani [2012] EWHC 842 (Admin); [2013] 1 WLR 82 and Wolkowicz & Biskup v Poland; Rizleriene v Lithuania [2013] EWHC 102 (Admin); [2013] 1 WLR 2402 remained applicable.
3. The evidence had materially changed since the original order. The appellant’s condition had worsened; both experts agreed that he suffered a form of schizophrenia with depressive and personality disorders, that his suicide risk was high, that he required continued hospital care, that he was unfit to plead, and that extradition would increase the risk of self-harm. The prognosis justified waiting to assess the effect of treatment. Discharge was therefore inappropriate because a significant improvement might occur within six to twelve months.
4. The Article 3 challenge failed. Mutual trust between European Union Convention states supported a presumption that Malta would fulfil its Convention obligations. The CPT material and the report of the Maltese lawyer did not amount to the clear and cogent evidence required to rebut that presumption. Krolik v Poland [2012] EWHC 2357 (Admin) was applied.
5. The Article 8 challenge also failed. Even assuming family and private life were engaged, the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements outweighed the interference. The relationship with the appellant’s mother and the availability of family or social-services support did not make extradition disproportionate. The court left its Article 3 and Article 8 conclusions undisturbed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Purdy ordered extradition on 2 January 2013. The Divisional Court allowed the appeal to the extent that it adjourned the extradition proceedings under section 25(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003; the Article 3 and Article 8 grounds failed.