Rawski v The Lublin Provincial Court Poland

Under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, a mental condition makes extradition unjust or oppressive only where the evidence establishes a sufficiently serious and unavoidable risk. A requesting European Union state is presumed capable of complying with its Convention obligations. That presumption requires cogent evidence to displace it.

An Article 3 challenge requires substantial grounds for believing that extradition creates a real risk of ill-treatment of the requisite severity. Arguments about prison conditions should ordinarily be raised before the District Judge and supported by proper evidence. Fresh, materially different allegations supported by no presently available evidence do not ordinarily justify an adjournment.

The appellant challenged an order requiring his extradition to Poland to serve the balance of a 12-year sentence. The Senior District Judge rejected arguments that his psychiatric condition made extradition unjust or oppressive under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, and concluded that extradition was compatible with his Convention rights.

On appeal, the appellant relied on his suicide risk and alleged that he would be held in solitary confinement as a category N prisoner, contrary to Article 3. The latter argument depended on new evidence and had not been properly advanced before the District Judge. The central issues were whether an adjournment was required and whether the evidence established oppression or a real risk of prohibited ill-treatment.

1. Adjournment. The application to adjourn was refused. The proposed category N evidence was not presently before the court, and the Article 3 argument was materially different from the case advanced below. It was neither proportionate, necessary nor required by fairness to postpone the appeal so that further evidence could be obtained.
2. Section 25. Applying the principles summarised by Aikens LJ in Richen Turner v Government of the United States of America, the court accepted that extradition was likely to increase the appellant’s suicidal ideation and that his mental condition reduced his ability to resist it. The evidence did not establish that the risk of successful suicide was sufficiently great to make extradition oppressive whatever preventive steps were taken. Regular monitoring could be communicated to the Polish prison authorities.
3. The court rejected the submission that monitoring itself would be oppressive. It also rejected the contention that Poland lacked adequate arrangements to manage the appellant’s condition and suicide risk. A requesting European Union state is presumed able to comply with its Convention obligations; cogent evidence is required to displace that presumption.
4. Article 3. The appellant had to show substantial grounds for believing that extradition created a real risk of ill-treatment of the requisite severity. The treatment had to be deliberately inflicted by state agents and cause serious suffering beyond what was implicit in imprisonment. Poland was presumed to comply with Article 3. The evidence did not persuasively establish that the appellant would be subjected to a particularly harsh regime, or that his confinement would be impermissible.
5. The extracts from the European Committee report were selective, expressed opinion, and did not establish Poland’s response. Horych v Poland did not assist because the decision was not placed before the court and the current Polish position was unclear. The arguments should have been raised before the District Judge on proper evidence. The appeal was dismissed. An order for taxation of legal costs was made.

1. Senior District Judge. The appellant’s extradition to Poland was ordered after the judge rejected the section 25 oppression argument and concluded that extradition was compatible with his Convention rights.
2. High Court (Administrative Court), [2013] EWHC 668 (Admin). The appeal was dismissed. The court refused an adjournment and upheld the extradition decision.