Uddin v General Medical Council & Ors

An Employment Tribunal is excluded by Equality Act 2010 section 120(7) only insofar as the particular discriminatory or harassing act complained of is subject to a statutory appeal, or to proceedings in the nature of an appeal. A statutory appeal under the Medical Act 1983 from an erasure or suspension decision meets that description.

The exclusion cannot be applied comprehensively to all complaints under section 53. The tribunal must identify the pleaded acts and determine whether each was in fact susceptible to the asserted alternative remedy. It cannot assume that earlier disciplinary or administrative acts were appealable, nor treat an obiter observation that judicial review may be an appeal-like proceeding as a binding determination.

A doctor alleged that the General Medical Council and its trustees had subjected him to race discrimination and race-related harassment during disciplinary processes leading to the erasure of his name from the medical register and his immediate suspension on 29 October 2010.

At a pre-hearing review, an Employment Judge held that the Employment Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under Equality Act 2010 section 120(7). The Judge relied on statutory appeal rights under the Medical Act 1983 and on judicial review. The Judge therefore did not decide whether claims could proceed against the individual trustees.

The appeal concerned alleged administrative and procedural acts preceding the Fitness to Practise Panel’s decisions. The central question was whether section 120(7) excluded the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over those particular acts.

1. Appeal allowed. The Employment Judge’s ruling that the Employment Tribunal had no jurisdiction was set aside. The case was remitted to a different Employment Judge.

2. Section 120(7) of the Equality Act 2010 excludes jurisdiction only in respect of an act under section 53 which may be challenged by an appeal, or proceedings in the nature of an appeal, under an enactment. The statutory appeals from Fitness to Practise Panel decisions under sections 38 and 40 of the Medical Act 1983 met that description. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Khan v General Medical Council, [1996] ICR 1032, was binding and remained applicable.

3. There was, however, no statutory appeal under the Medical Act in respect of the alleged acts leading up to, but not including, the erasure and immediate suspension decisions. The Employment Judge therefore erred by relying on an appeal right which did not cover the acts advanced in the Employment Tribunal claim.

4. The pleaded acts had not been sufficiently identified. Without identifying them, the Employment Judge could not decide whether judicial review was available in relation to them, including allegations of conduct extending over a period. The observation in Tariquez-Zaman v General Medical Council that judicial review could oust Employment Tribunal jurisdiction was obiter because that appeal had been decided on the absence of the alleged variation in registration terms. It could not be relied upon as a holding that judicial review excluded jurisdiction here.

5. The remitted Judge was directed to determine jurisdiction under section 120(7), limitation, and whether claims could be pursued against the individual trustee members. The Judge also explained that section 53(2)(c) of the Equality Act extends protection against detriment beyond the narrower protection formerly provided by section 12(1)(c) of the Race Relations Act 1976.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Appeal allowed. The jurisdiction decision was set aside and the claim remitted to a different Employment Judge.
• Employment Tribunal: At a pre-hearing review, the Employment Judge held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under Equality Act 2010 section 120(7) and did not determine the claims against the individual trustees.