Bonnett Taylor (Appellant) v The Queen (Respondent) (Jamaica)

In a criminal appeal based on undisclosed or unused evidence, fault alone does not establish a miscarriage of justice. The appellate court must assess the impact on the trial and verdict, including whether the evidence created a real possibility of a different outcome. An eyewitness’s accurate special knowledge may strongly support reliability. A trial judge has discretion when responding to a juror who knows the accused, but must protect trial fairness. Jury concerns should ordinarily be raised in the jury’s absence. A clear direction to decide only on the evidence may sufficiently address the risk of prejudice. The conviction appeal was dismissed, but the parole eligibility period was backdated to the date of custody.

Bonnett Taylor was convicted of murder after a second trial, following an earlier trial at which the jury failed to reach a verdict. The Court of Appeal of Jamaica dismissed his appeal against conviction and sentence.

Before the Privy Council, he argued that the trial was unfair because a potentially important statement by Mrs Hartley had not been used, and because a juror who knew him had been questioned and discharged in the presence of the other jurors. He also challenged the commencement date for the 25-year minimum period before parole eligibility.

The central questions were whether the unused statement rendered the conviction unsafe, whether the handling of the juror caused a miscarriage of justice, and whether the sentence should be adjusted.

Lord Hope delivered the majority judgment. The Board dismissed the appeal against conviction and allowed the appeal against sentence to the limited extent stated below.

1. Unused evidence. A finding that the prosecution or defence was at fault in failing to use Mrs Hartley’s statement was insufficient by itself. The court had to examine the effect of the failure on the trial and verdict: Teeluk v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] UKPC 14, McInnes v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 7 and R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66. The appellant had to show what the evidence would have revealed and how it might have affected the jury. Mrs Hartley’s statement contained significant omissions but no unequivocal contradiction of Grey’s account. Grey’s detailed knowledge of the shooting, supported by the medical and scene evidence, provided powerful grounds for accepting that he had witnessed it. There was no reasonable possibility of a different verdict.
2. Juror irregularity. The trial judge had discretion to choose the appropriate response to an unexpected disclosure by a juror: R v Orgles [1994] 1 WLR 108. The judge also had a duty to inquire into and deal with the situation so as to ensure a fair trial. On the information available, the judge was not seriously at fault in making no further inquiry. His clear direction that the case must be decided only on the evidence was sufficient to address any risk that the discharged juror had shared improper information. The Board proceeded on the assumption that the jury understood and followed that direction, supported by Montgomery v HM Advocate [2003] 1 AC 641 and the other authorities cited.
3. Practice guidance. Matters potentially affecting jury integrity should be raised in the absence of the jury, and the judge may need to establish whether information was shared. The guidance described in Pullar v HM Advocate 1993 JC 126 concerning disclosure of the names of important participants and jurors’ opportunity to raise concerns was left to Jamaican judicial practice.
4. Sentence. Since permission to appeal had been granted on substantial fresh grounds, the basis for the Court of Appeal’s original commencement date no longer applied. Following Hamilton v The Queen [2012] UKPC 37, Taylor was entitled to credit for the whole period in custody awaiting disposal of the appeal. The 25-year period therefore ran from 23 September 1998, not 15 April 1999.
5. Dissent. Lord Kerr would have quashed the conviction. He considered that the appellate court must assess safety, not possible guilt, and should ask whether the statement might reasonably have led to an acquittal, taking its face-value content without speculative reconstruction. He regarded the statement as capable of substantially undermining the prosecution case. He considered the juror issue alone insufficient to make the conviction unsafe.

• Privy Council: In [2013] UKPC 8, the conviction appeal was dismissed. The sentence appeal was allowed to the extent that the parole eligibility period was ordered to run from 23 September 1998.
• Court of Appeal of Jamaica: The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed, the conviction and sentence were affirmed, and the 25-year period was ordered to run from 15 April 1999.