S (Children), Re (Rev 1)

In placement-order cases, a parent has no automatic right to a further assessment when circumstances change. The court must decide whether assessment would be purposeful, bearing in mind the child’s timetable and welfare. A placement order requires substantive evaluation of the welfare checklist and an explanation of why adoption is necessary rather than a less interventionist arrangement. Formulaic references to welfare, proportionality and article 8 are insufficient. Non-disclosure or deceit is not necessarily determinative of parenting capacity or co-operation with authorities. Where material evidence is unreconciled or the reasoning is inadequate, the decision may require further assessment and rehearing.

The father appealed against a placement order made by HHJ Karp in respect of his daughter, A-M, following care proceedings in the Willesden County Court. The mother had been excluded as a future carer. The father, who was working in Norway and had separated from his wife, sought to care for A-M, while the local authority pursued adoption and the Children’s Guardian changed position during the proceedings.

The appeal concerned whether the placement decision was supported by adequate evidence and reasoning, particularly in light of changed circumstances, divergent expert views and Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. The central questions were whether a further assessment was required and whether the judge sufficiently explained why adoption, rather than long-term fostering or another arrangement, was necessary.

1. Appeal allowed. The full care order was replaced by an interim care order, and the case was remitted to HHJ Karp for further case-management directions and, ultimately, rehearing.
2. A further assessment is not automatic whenever a parent asserts changed circumstances. The issue is whether, on the facts of the particular case, the proposed delay would be purposeful and compatible with the child’s timetable. Here, the father’s domestic circumstances had changed, the care proposals and professional positions had shifted, and adoption would have significant consequences for established familial ties. It was therefore erroneous to proceed without a further assessment, including consideration of the prospective input of Norwegian social services.
3. The judge was entitled, on Miss Edwards’s evidence, to find that A-M required a high level of reparative parenting. However, the judgment did not reconcile that evidence with Dr Yates’s materially different opinion or adjudicate upon the conflict when Dr Yates was not called at the final hearing.
4. Non-disclosure or deceit is not necessarily determinative of parenting capacity or the ability to co-operate with authorities. The significance of the father’s conduct required evaluation in accordance with the approach discussed in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720. Showing the children a photograph of a new baby was not, without more, evidence that the father prioritised his own needs over theirs.
5. The reasoning supporting the placement order was inadequate. The judge referred generally to the welfare checklist in section 1(4), ruled out the parents and considered long-term fostering, but did not substantively evaluate adoption’s advantages and disadvantages or explain why A-M’s welfare required adoption rather than something short of adoption. Formulaic references to article 8 and proportionality did not cure that defect. The judgment therefore failed to engage with the substance required by Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 and In the Matter of W (A Child), In the Matter of H (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1177.
6. The conclusion was fact specific and did not establish a general right to repeated assessment. The father was awarded appeal costs of £13,787.70; Re T (Children) [2012] UKSC 36 was distinguishable because the present application concerned appeal costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the Willesden County Court, where HHJ Karp made a placement order on 31 July 2013. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, substituted an interim care order for the full care order and remitted the case for further directions and rehearing.