M-F (Children)

The 26-week limit for care proceedings is not an inflexible constraint. An extension may be granted only where it is necessary to resolve the proceedings justly. The imperative demands of fair process or the child’s welfare must justify it.

An adjournment application requires anxious scrutiny, but the trial judge may determine it without oral evidence. The court should guard against an adjournment application becoming a mini-trial.

Where an extension is necessary, the court may set a timetable extending beyond the next eight-week period. Describing delay as planned or purposeful does not establish necessity and is not sufficient to justify an extension.

Care proceedings concerning two siblings had begun in March 2013. Several final hearings were adjourned after changes in the children’s circumstances, professional recommendations and care plans. The proceedings concerning the older child concluded with a supervision order.

At the fourth final hearing, the Family Court adjourned the proceedings concerning the younger child for a short, defined period. The purpose was to obtain further evidence about the mother’s engagement with therapeutic work and her capacity to care safely for him. The local authority appealed, arguing that the judge should first have heard oral evidence, that further delay contravened the statutory timetable, and that the court was improperly supervising implementation of the proposed care plan.

The central issue was whether the judge had been entitled to conclude that the adjournment and resulting extension were necessary to resolve the care proceedings justly.

1. Permission to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed unanimously. The Family Court judge had been entitled to adjourn the proceedings for a short, defined period so that further evidence could be obtained about the mother’s progress and capacity to care safely for the child.

2. The decision whether to hear oral evidence before determining an adjournment application was pre-eminently a case-management matter for the trial judge. Appellate intervention was inappropriate because the decision fell comfortably within the permissible range. Oral evidence may sometimes be useful where it is narrow and potentially decisive. It will often be inappropriate where several witnesses would have to be heard, because an adjournment application should not become a mini-trial.

3. The 26-week requirement under section 32 of the Children Act 1989 is imperative, but not an inflexible constraint. An extension must be necessary to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly. Only the demands of fair process or the child’s welfare will suffice, and every extension requires specific justification. Guidance in In re S [2014] EWCC B44 (Fam) must be read contextually and not as though its language were statutory.

4. The judge applied anxious scrutiny and had solid evidential grounds for the adjournment. The case had already been derailed by unexpected developments. There was evidence of some change by the mother, but further focused evaluation was required. The adjournment had a specific purpose and was appropriately time-limited. The judge had also balanced the harm caused by delay against the child’s wishes, identity, placement circumstances and need for a fair welfare decision.

5. The adjournment did not amount to improper judicial supervision of the local authority’s care plan. The court had not yet decided whether to make a care order or a supervision order. That unresolved question remained within the court’s exclusive competence, even on the most restrictive reading of section 31(3A) of the Children Act 1989.

6. Where an extension is necessary, the court may set a timetable extending beyond the next eight-week period. Paragraph 6.5 of PD12A distinguishes the timetable from each required extension and expressly accommodates a timetable extending beyond the next eight weeks.

7. The expression “planned and purposeful delay” should no longer be used as a substitute for the statutory test. A planned and purposeful proposal may help demonstrate necessity, but it is not sufficient by itself. Each case must be decided on its own facts.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Granted permission to appeal but unanimously dismissed the local authority’s appeal from the adjournment order. The proceedings remained listed before the same Family Court judge.

2. Family Court at Brighton: Her Honour Judge Probyn adjourned the fourth final hearing on 28 April 2014. She directed a further report after six therapeutic sessions and held that the additional evidence and extension were necessary to resolve the application justly. She refused permission to appeal the following day.