T (Children) (Rev 1)

In an application to dispense with parental consent to adoption, the phrase ‘nothing else will do’ must be read with the statutory requirements that adoption is exceptional and justified by the overriding demands of the child’s best interests. A credible alternative need not be pursued unless it is realistically possible and in the child’s interests. A welfare analysis may be spread throughout a judgment. It is sufficient if the judgment, read as a whole, carefully evaluates all realistic options and weighs the advantages and disadvantages of rehabilitation and adoption.

The mother appealed from care and placement orders made by His Honour Judge Waller in the Watford County Court on 21 February 2014 concerning her two youngest children, J and O. The children had been placed in foster care following findings concerning neglect, domestic violence and the mother’s failure to recognise the risks and shortcomings in her parenting. The appeal was limited to whether the judge had adequately assessed rehabilitation of the children to the mother with appropriate support, and whether he had given sufficient reasons for dispensing with parental consent and approving adoption.

The appeal was dismissed. Lady Justice King gave the judgment, with Lord Justice Laws and Lord Justice Moore-Bick agreeing.

1. The statutory test for dispensing with parental consent to adoption is found in sections 52 (1) (b) and 1 (4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, read in light of the adoption guidance. The phrase ‘nothing else will do’ must not be isolated from the requirement that adoption is made only in exceptional circumstances and where the overriding requirements of the child’s best interests so require.
2. The existence of another credible option does not automatically require that option to be pursued. The court must ask whether it is realistically possible and whether it is in the child’s interests. An option may be rejected because it is not realistically possible, or because it is possible but contrary to the child’s welfare.
3. On the evidence, the judge was entitled to find that the mother did not understand or accept the past neglect, the risks posed by the father or the need for change. Those findings made rehabilitation unrealistic, even with support, and justified the conclusion that returning the children would expose them to significant harm.
4. The judge had asked whether permanent separation and severance of legal ties were necessary or whether another realistic option existed. His analysis of rehabilitation and adoption was distributed throughout the judgment, but was nevertheless holistic and sufficiently reasoned. A judgment is not rendered unlawfully linear merely because, after rejecting rehabilitation, adoption is the only realistic alternative.
5. The judge had conscientiously considered all realistic options and weighed the advantages and disadvantages of adoption, including the severance of the legal relationship. The care and placement orders therefore stood.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the care and placement orders made below. [2014] EWCA Civ 1549
2. Watford County Court: His Honour Judge Waller made care and placement orders for J and O on 21 February 2014.