R (A Child), Re

In contact proceedings, the child’s welfare is paramount. Parent-child contact is ordinarily a fundamental element of family life and may be ended only as a last resort, where cogent reasons show that it would be detrimental to the child’s welfare and no practicable alternative remains.

Before making an order which prevents even indirect contact, the court must take a medium- to long-term view and investigate all reasonable measures to facilitate contact. Those measures may include preparation, professional support and supervised direct contact. A child’s wishes and feelings require proper weight, particularly as maturity increases, but do not remove the court’s duty to examine workable alternatives.

The father appealed against an order of the Brentford County Court made on 20 January 2014. The order provided that the child should live with her mother, ended indirect contact with the father, and made no order for direct contact. The child could contact the father if she chose, with the mother’s support.

The father had not seen the child for more than nine years. A Cafcass officer reported that the child, then nearly 12, strongly opposed any contact and had not been coached by her mother. The judge accepted that both parents were capable and loving, but followed the recommendation that there be no contact.

The appeal concerned whether ending all court-ordered contact was justified without investigating measures that might safely reintroduce direct contact.

1. Appeal allowed. The no-contact order was set aside and the father’s application for direct contact was remitted to the county court.

2. The child’s welfare was paramount under the Children Act 1989. The court accepted that the child’s clear wishes, her age, the lengthy separation and the unproductive indirect contact were highly material. Her fears nevertheless arose without maltreatment or adverse experience of actual contact, since the father was found to be a decent man.

3. Contact between parent and child is ordinarily a fundamental element of family life. It may be terminated only exceptionally, for cogent welfare reasons, when it would be detrimental to the child and there is no alternative. The court must promote contact, consider the medium- and long-term consequences, and grapple with all reasonably available means of achieving it. Those principles were applied from [2011] EWCA Civ 521.

4. The first-instance judge had not investigated what practical assistance could facilitate contact. There was no evidence about local services, professional preparation, supervision or other support. Nor had the court expressly considered the range of powers available, including supervised direct contact. It was therefore not driven to conclude that the child would gain no benefit from a continuing attempt at contact, that the position was one of last resort, or that no alternative existed.

5. The matter was remitted to the same judge for prompt case management. Evidence was to be obtained about available services and support, followed by up to three supervised direct meetings and reports upon them. The purpose was to ensure that every reasonably demanded step was taken to facilitate contact if it could safely be achieved.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Allowed the father’s appeal, set aside the order preventing court-ordered contact, and remitted the application for direct contact.
• Brentford County Court On 20 January 2014, ordered that the child live with her mother, made no order for contact with the father, and discharged the previous indirect-contact orders.