S (A Child), Re

The need for long-term supervision is not, by itself, a reason to refuse direct contact between a child and an absent parent. Contact is almost always in the child’s interests and should be denied only where the child’s welfare requires it.

A court refusing direct contact must identify cogent, evidence-based reasons. It must clearly explain any departure from a specialist risk assessment or a CAFCASS recommendation. Disturbance, inconvenience or anticipated unreliability will not suffice without findings that the resulting harm requires the absence of direct contact.

A father appealed against a child arrangements order permitting only indirect contact with his daughter and dismissing his application for supervised direct contact. His convictions included making pornographic images of children. A specialist assessment found the risk of harm to the child to be small, and a CAFCASS officer recommended indefinitely supervised contact through an accredited contact centre.

The Family Court refused direct contact, principally because supervision would be required in the long term and because contact was likely to disturb the child and her mother. The appeal concerned whether those reasons adequately justified rejecting the professional recommendation and whether the judge had wrongly adopted a general objection to long-term supervised contact.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The Family Court failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the CAFCASS officer’s recommendation or for refusing direct contact. The case was remitted for rehearing and was to be listed for urgent directions before the Designated Family Judge for Cambridge.
2. Long-term supervision is not inherently inconsistent with a child’s welfare. Although unsupervised contact will ordinarily be the goal, some children benefit from continuing supervised contact. That principle applies in private law proceedings as well as public law proceedings. Practical scarcity of long-term supervision does not justify rejecting it where it is otherwise appropriate.
3. Contact with a non-resident parent is a fundamental element of family life and is almost always in the child’s interests. It should be denied only where the child’s welfare demands that outcome. Where a court refuses direct contact, it must identify cogent reasons grounded in the evidence. Where specialist risk evidence and experienced CAFCASS recommendations favour contact, the reasons for rejecting them must be clearly articulated.
4. There was no direct evidence that reintroducing contact would disturb the child or her mother in a manner harmful to the child’s welfare. Before relying on disturbance, the court must have evidence of its nature and anticipated extent, make findings upon that evidence, and explain why it requires the absence of direct contact. The ordinary disruption, inconvenience or interference associated with restoring contact is insufficient. Only in the most extreme circumstances will disturbance to the child or carer justify an order preventing the child from seeing the absent parent.
5. Concern about a parent’s unreliability cannot, without evidence and findings, justify refusing contact. The court must find a real risk that unreliability would destabilise and adversely affect the child or carer to such an extent that the child’s welfare requires no direct contact. No such evidence or findings existed here. Merely stating that the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 had been considered could not replace the missing analysis.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The father’s appeal was allowed unanimously. The order refusing direct contact was set aside and the matter was remitted for rehearing, with urgent directions before the Designated Family Judge for Cambridge.
2. Family Court sitting at Cambridge: His Honour Judge Yelton dismissed the father’s application for supervised direct contact and made a child arrangements order providing only for indirect contact by letters, cards and gifts.