Re A

A supervised-contact order need not be a temporary stepping stone to unsupervised contact. Where the child’s welfare requires it, supervised direct contact may be the only safe alternative to indirect or no direct contact.

An order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 is a protective filter, not a prohibition on justified future change. The court must consider it separately from contact arrangements, but the same facts may justify both orders. It may be appropriate where repeated litigation or a campaign of harassment causes real harm, provided the restriction is welfare-based, proportionate and permits leave for a credible application with a real prospect of materially changing contact.

The mother appealed orders made in private-law proceedings concerning her daughter, A. The judge confirmed that A should live with her father, directed professionally supervised contact with the mother for up to six hours every fortnight, and made a two-year order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989.

Permission was limited to the contact and section 91(14) orders. The mother accepted that, on the unchallenged findings, contact presently required supervision. She contended that supervision combined with the leave restriction unlawfully prevented progress to unsupervised contact.

The central issue was whether the two orders, separately or together, impermissibly fettered the future development of a natural relationship between mother and child.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge was entitled to order professionally supervised contact. The unchallenged findings showed a high risk of abduction, denigration of the father, and inappropriate medical examination or investigation if contact were unsupervised. Supervision protected the child from emotional conflict and disruption. In these circumstances, the realistic choice was supervised direct contact or no direct contact, not supervised contact as a preliminary stage to unsupervised contact.

2. The court followed Re S (a Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 689: although supervision will often lead to unsupervised contact, it may also be the means by which a child can safely retain a relationship with an absent parent. The order was justified by the child’s welfare and was not conditional upon the mother undertaking therapy.

3. The Re P guidelines remained the governing framework for section 91(14) orders. The power is discretionary, welfare-focused, sparingly used and proportionate. It is not confined to repeated unreasonable court applications. Clear evidence that a parent’s overall conduct, including harassment through complaints or communications, risks unacceptable strain or harm may justify a leave restriction.

4. The court gave guidance on the modern context. Persistent email, social-media and other communications may facilitate “lawfare”, namely the use of proceedings as a weapon of conflict. In an appropriate case, the court should be less reluctant to use section 91(14) as a protective filter for a child and the other parent. It must not, however, be used merely to provide breathing space, make leave conditional, or prevent supervised contact progressing if credible evidence justifies an application.

5. Section 91(14) did not fetter future contact. If credible evidence within the two-year period could substantially change the form or extent of contact, either parent could seek leave. The judge had separately justified the order as necessary respite from destructive litigation and harassment. The same facts could properly support both supervision and the leave restriction.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the mother’s appeal against the supervised-contact and section 91(14) orders: [2021] EWCA Civ 1749.

• High Court: Cohen J granted limited permission to appeal on contact and the section 91(14) order, transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal, and later refused renewed permission on the remaining grounds.

• Chelmsford County Court and Family Court: HHJ Dawson confirmed that A should live with her father, ordered professionally supervised contact with the mother, and imposed a two-year section 91(14) restriction.