C (Child Arrangements Orders; Domestic Abuse; Child Focused Court), Re

The Child Focused Court model changes procedure and culture, but not the substantive law governing private-law children cases. The child’s welfare remains paramount under the Children Act 1989, and PD12J continues to require rigorous attention to domestic abuse, future risk and the safety of the child and resident parent.

A fact-finding hearing is required only where findings are necessary for a reliable welfare and risk assessment. The court should identify the real welfare issues, decide whether admissions provide a sufficient factual foundation, and investigate only material disputes. Robust and proportionate case management remains compatible with procedural fairness.

Where domestic abuse is established, contact may be ordered only if the court explains why the arrangements are safe and beneficial. A section 91(14) order requires an individualised analysis and cannot be imposed on a victim parent merely because both parties need respite from litigation.

The mother appealed final child-arrangements and associated orders made by the Family Court sitting at Wrexham on 22 April 2026. The four children lived with her. The judge ordered reduced, supervised direct contact with their father, ended telephone contact, declined to restrict his parental responsibility or grant further protective orders, and made a one-year section 91(14) order against both parents.

The proceedings arose against a background of the father’s admitted domestic abuse, later breaches of boundaries during supervised contact, and conflicting evidence about the children’s welfare and wishes. Cafcass Cymru recommended an end to direct contact. The judge rejected that recommendation and found that carefully supervised contact better served the children’s welfare.

The appeal raised whether the Child Focused Court procedure had unfairly curtailed investigation of domestic abuse, whether further fact-finding was necessary, whether contact was safe, and whether the order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 could properly apply to the mother.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The court set aside the order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 so far as it restricted the mother. The appeal was dismissed in all other respects.

2. The Child Focused Court model introduced an investigative, child-centred procedure. It did not alter the governing law. PD12J remained fully applicable, the child’s welfare remained paramount, and domestic abuse had to be assessed as part of the welfare evaluation.

3. A fact-finding hearing is not an end in itself. The question is whether findings are necessary to assess future risk reliably and determine welfare. The judge was entitled to proceed without further fact-finding because the principal post-2024 incidents were admitted or sufficiently understood, and their risks could be addressed by calibrated safeguards. The hearing was not unfair merely because oral evidence was firmly controlled; the judge retained the duty to manage proceedings fairly, expeditiously and proportionately.

4. The judge had recognised the seriousness and continuing effects of the father’s admitted abuse. He was entitled to conclude that the father’s later conduct, although improper and relevant to risk, did not itself preclude all direct contact. He imposed safeguards by reducing the duration and frequency of contact, retaining supervision, briefing supervisors about risk, prohibiting unsafe water activities, and terminating telephone contact. Ending telephone contact was a proportionate response to the father’s denigration of the mother and its emotional impact on the children.

5. The judge was entitled to depart from the Cafcass recommendation. He gave adequate reasons, including the children’s expressed wishes, the harm caused by abruptly ending contact, deficiencies in the Cafcass analysis, and his own favourable assessment of the proposed supervisor. The appellate court would not disturb that welfare discretion.

6. However, the judge gave no sufficient analysis showing that the mother’s conduct fell within the statutory and procedural bases for a section 91(14) order. It was wrong to equate her position with the father’s in circumstances of proven domestic abuse. Any issue concerning implementation after the appeal could be referred to the trial judge on a formal application.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The mother’s appeal was allowed only as to the section 91(14) restriction imposed on her: [2026] EWCA Civ 1216 .
• Family Court sitting at Wrexham: On 22 April 2026, McKendrick J made final child-arrangements orders for supervised direct contact and associated orders, including a section 91(14) restriction against both parents.