A and T (Children) (Appeal: Duration of section 91(14) order), Re

A section 91(14) restriction must be carefully tailored to the harm it seeks to prevent. Its duration and scope must be proportionate, and the court must explain why the selected period is appropriate.

A lengthy restriction may be justified for a particular type of application, such as an application to change the child’s living arrangements. It may nevertheless be disproportionate to impose the same period for applications concerning contact or specific issues. The court should balance the benefit of protecting children from further litigation against the disadvantage of restricting legitimate applications about their welfare.

The father appealed against the duration of a section 91(14) order made by HHJ Wicks on 4 February 2025. The order prevented either parent from applying under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 without permission for three years.

Permission to appeal was limited to duration. The first-instance judge had dismissed the father’s applications concerning contact and a possible change in the children’s living arrangements, while recording arrangements for the father to attend their football activities. The central issue was whether a blanket three-year restriction was proportionate in circumstances where the litigation had harmed the children but the father had not abused the court process.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The judge below was entitled to make a section 91(14) order because prolonged litigation had become harmful to the children. However, he erred by imposing a three-year restriction without addressing proportionality or explaining the duration.
2. The duration of a section 91(14) order is a critical issue. The court must balance the benefit of giving children respite from corrosive litigation against the disadvantage of restricting a parent’s ability to raise legitimate welfare issues. The restriction should be proportionate to the harm identified and tailored to the type of application restrained. This follows the guidance in Re P (Section 91(14) Guidelines) [1999] 2 FLR 573 and paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 12Q.
3. The case was not one involving repeated abusive applications or “lawfare”. The father’s application to enforce the January 2024 order had been expressly contemplated by that order and followed the approach recommended by the children’s guardian. The desirability of reducing pressure on court lists should not routinely justify a restriction where unreasonable litigation conduct is absent.
4. A three-year restriction on applications for a “lives with” order was proportionate. The children’s ages, the absence of a realistic prospect of a change of residence, and the need to remove continuing uncertainty justified that period.
5. A restriction concerning applications for a “spend time with” order should have lasted 12 months. The children’s relationship with their father remained important and the existing arrangements might require review. The restriction was therefore extended only until 30 April 2026. Restrictions concerning other section 8 applications were immediately discharged.
6. The court encouraged mediation concerning the choice of secondary school. The decision did not prevent a future section 91(14) order if the children’s welfare required it.

• High Court (Family Division): The appeal against the duration of the section 91(14) order was allowed in part. The three-year restriction was retained for “lives with” applications, shortened for “spend time with” applications, and discharged for other section 8 applications.