YL v A Local Authority & Ors

On an application to discharge a care order, the court must make a current welfare evaluation under Children Act 1989 s 1. Welfare is paramount, the welfare checklist must be considered, and the applicant must show that discharge serves the child’s interests. The original threshold need not be re-proved; harm and risk form part of the welfare evaluation, which must be cross-checked for Convention-rights proportionality.

A section 91(14) order is a protective measure of last resort. It may be made where further litigation would put the child or another individual at risk of harm, and its scope and duration must be proportionate. A 12-month restriction was justified where repeated applications would disrupt therapeutic work, permanence planning and a settled placement.

AM, aged six, had been in long-term foster care under a care order made on 19 November 2021 following findings of domestic abuse and harm. The father applied to discharge the order and sought a pathway to direct contact and reunification. The mother supported that application and made her own application for contact and reunification.

The local authority and Children’s Guardian opposed both applications and sought a 12-month order under section 91(14) restricting further applications without permission. The central issues were AM’s current welfare, the relevance of the earlier findings, the effect of therapeutic life story work, the parents’ ability to support AM’s needs and placement, and whether further litigation would cause harm.

1. Discharge and welfare. The applications to discharge the care order and to obtain direct contact were refused. Applying section 1 of the Children Act 1989 and the principles in TT (Children: Discharge of Care Order) [2021] EWCA Civ 742, the judge treated AM’s welfare as paramount, evaluated welfare at the date of decision, considered the welfare checklist, required the parents to show that discharge was in AM’s interests, treated the section 31(2) threshold as irrelevant, and cross-checked the interference with Article 8 rights for necessity and proportionality.
2. AM had made progress in foster care but continued to require safety, stability and Therapeutic Life Story Work. The parents’ continued denial of the earlier findings and their unsupported allegations meant that they could not support a coherent account of AM’s early experiences, his therapeutic development or his current placement. Those findings remained central to the current welfare assessment because the expert evidence linked them to AM’s continuing therapeutic needs.
3. Direct contact was refused. It could only be considered after the therapeutic work had been completed and tolerated, followed by updated psychological assessments addressing the parents’ capacity to understand AM’s difficulties, prioritise his emotional needs, relate empathically, work with professionals and carers, and approach him according to his identified needs.
4. Section 91(14). The court adopted the protective, non-punitive approach described in F v M [2023] EWFC 5. A section 91(14) order was a discretionary measure of last resort, available where further applications created a risk of harm and required a proportionate duration. The parents were likely to continue litigating, delaying permanence planning, exposing AM to further professionals and increasing the stress on his carers. A 12-month order was therefore justified, necessary and proportionate. The existing section 34(4) order was maintained, a six-month automatic filter under section 91(17) was noted, and a reporting restriction and anonymity order were made.

• Court of Appeal: Permission to appeal the care order made on 19 November 2021 was refused on 18 May 2022.
• High Court (Family Division): The present judgment determined the later applications to discharge the care order, obtain direct contact and impose a section 91(14) restriction.