Re Z (A Child)

In determining arrangements for a child, the court’s paramount consideration is the child’s welfare. A parent’s repeated pressure on a child to support that parent’s position, denigration of the other parent, and refusal to respect the child’s developing autonomy may amount to emotional abuse and justify protective orders.

Supervised contact may be ordered indefinitely where it is the only means of preserving a beneficial relationship while protecting the child from further harm. A Children Act 1989 section 91(14) restriction may be made where further proceedings would expose the child to unacceptable stress, coercive pressure or continuing domestic abuse. It is a filter rather than an absolute bar and must be proportionate.

For removal to a non-Hague Convention country, the court must be positively satisfied that the advantages outweigh the welfare risks, considering the risk of breach, the consequences of breach and available safeguards.

The father applied to discharge or vary an existing female genital mutilation protection order, to take Z to Guinea, and to increase his contact with her. The mother opposed those applications. Z, represented by a rule 16.4 guardian, opposed them and sought supervised contact and restrictions on further applications.

The proceedings arose from longstanding Children Act 1989 and Family Law Act 1996 litigation. A 2017 order restricted overseas travel because of the risk of female genital mutilation in Guinea. The central issues were Z’s welfare, the effect of the father’s conduct on her wishes and feelings, whether the existing protection order should remain, whether contact should be supervised, and whether a section 91(14) order was necessary.

1. Welfare and factual findings. Z’s welfare and best interests were paramount under section 1 of the Children Act 1989. On the balance of probabilities, the father had repeatedly discussed the proceedings with Z, denigrated the mother, challenged Z’s expressed wishes, and placed her under emotional pressure to support his position. This had inhibited her ability to speak freely and caused emotional harm.
2. Contact. Supervision was necessary to protect Z from further emotional abuse while preserving the beneficial aspects of her relationship with her father. The court accepted that Z wished to maintain a relationship with him, but found that unsupervised contact would leave her responsible for policing his behaviour and would expose her to continuing pressure. The order for supervised contact was indefinite. It was not a pathway to unsupervised contact because the father had repeatedly failed to modify his conduct despite professional advice and parenting programmes.
3. Travel and FGM protection. The existing female genital mutilation protection order remained necessary. Applying the principles in Re R (Prohibited Steps Order) and Re K (Removal from Jurisdiction: Practice), the court considered the magnitude of any risk of breach, the seriousness of the consequences and the effectiveness of safeguards. Guinea was a non-Hague Convention country, and there was no cogent independent evidence that the previously established risk had diminished. The order was varied only by removing the provision permitting Z to apply to travel with her father at 13.
4. Further applications. Section 91(14) was applied as a protective filter. The court balanced Z’s welfare against the father’s access to the court and concluded that further proceedings risked unacceptable stress and continuing coercive pressure. The restriction was necessary and proportionate, and would remain until Z was 16. It did not impose an absolute bar: an application for leave could be made if circumstances materially changed and the father demonstrated meaningful change in his conduct.

This was a first-instance decision. The judgment describes earlier Family Court proceedings and a previous High Court judgment, including the 2017 decision in Z (A Child) (FGMPO: Prevalence of FGM) [2017] EWHC 3566 (Fam), which had imposed the existing travel restrictions.