Horne & Meredith Properties v Cox & Anor

The alternative limb of section 30(1)(c) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 is not dependent on a breach of covenant. It permits consideration of any sufficiently connected reason concerning the tenant’s use or management of the holding, and is not confined to the ordinary landlord and tenant relationship.

Litigation pursued to vindicate rights granted by the tenancy, including rights of way and parking rights, may be such a reason. The court must then make a separate evaluative judgment whether the tenant ought not to receive a new tenancy. That judgment turns on fairness to the landlord in being compelled to resume legal relations with the tenant, having regard to the tenant’s past conduct.

The respondents were business tenants of shop premises under a tenancy protected by Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. The tenancy included rights of way and a right to park in six spaces.

The landlord opposed renewal under section 30(1)(f) and section 30(1)(c). His Honour Judge Main QC rejected the redevelopment ground but held that section 30(1)(c) was established. He ordered the tenancy to end on 1 May 2013.

The tenants appealed on a single permitted ground. They contended that their extensive litigation with the landlord over alleged obstructions of the rights of way was not a reason connected with the use or management of the holding.

Appeal dismissed. Lewison LJ, with whom Ryder LJ and Sir Stanley Burnton agreed, held that the judge had been entitled to refuse a new tenancy under section 30(1)(c) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954.

1. The holding defined by section 23(3) comprised not merely the shop but also the tenancy rights of way and parking. Property comprised in a tenancy includes incorporeal hereditaments, such as rights of way: Pointon York Group Ltd v Poulton [2006] EWCA Civ 1001.

2. Section 30(1)(c) contains two disjunctive alternatives. A landlord relying on the latter alternative need not first prove a substantial breach of covenant. The statutory language is deliberately broad. It is not confined to matters arising from the parties’ relationship strictly as landlord and tenant, but allows consideration of all relevant matters connected with the tenant’s past, present or future use or management of the holding. This followed Beard v Williams [1986] 1 EGLR 148, Turner and Bell v Searles (Stanford Le Hope) Ltd [1977] 33 P & CR 208, and Fowles v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1270.

3. Litigation may satisfy that connection where it concerns the enforcement of rights granted by the tenancy. Eichner v Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 1120 supported that conclusion. Litigation alone does not compel refusal. The distinct statutory question is whether, in light of its conduct, the tenant ought not to be granted a new tenancy.

4. That question is an evaluative judgment about the fairness of requiring the landlord to re-enter legal relations with the tenant, having regard to the tenant’s past behaviour: Lyons v Central Commercial Properties Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 869. Fault or culpability will usually be present. The judge was entitled to find that the tenants’ repetitive, baseless and disproportionate litigation concerning their tenancy rights had destroyed the relationship and made refusal fair.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). By [2014] EWCA Civ 423, the court unanimously dismissed the tenants’ appeal on the meaning of section 30(1)(c) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954.

• Stoke on Trent County Court (His Honour Judge Main QC). By an order dated 21 December 2012, the judge found that the redevelopment ground under section 30(1)(f) was not made out, but that section 30(1)(c) justified refusal of a new tenancy. The tenancy was ordered to terminate on 1 May 2013.