Liverpool & Anor v R.

A life sentence under Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 225 is mandatory where the statutory conditions are met. The assessment of whether the offence is sufficiently serious is composite. It requires consideration of the offence, relevant convictions, the danger posed to the public and the adequacy of alternative sentences.

Conspiracy to murder may be sentenced by analogy with the attempted murder guideline. Although a planned killing may be a Level 1 offence, the appropriate Level 1 category depends on actual physical or psychological harm to the intended victim. Where there is little or no such harm, the lower starting point applies. Mental illness may justify a limited reduction in culpability. A subordinate co-conspirator must receive a sentence reflecting individual responsibility.

The appellants were convicted at the Exeter Crown Court of conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to rob Joss Stone. They had travelled from Manchester to Devon with weapons, restraints, maps and material recording a plan to rob and kill her. They were arrested before the plan was carried out.

Liverpool received life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 10 years and eight months, and a concurrent 10-year sentence for conspiracy to rob. Bradshaw received 18 years’ imprisonment and a concurrent eight-year sentence. Both appealed their sentences. The central issues were whether Liverpool’s life sentence was justified and whether the sentencing starting points and reductions for each appellant were excessive.

1. The appeals were allowed in part. Liverpool’s challenge to the imposition of life imprisonment was dismissed, but his minimum term and concurrent robbery sentence were reduced. Bradshaw’s determinate sentences were also reduced.
2. Applying the authoritative guidance in Burinskas [2014] EWCA Crim 334, the court held that the section 225 assessment under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was composite. Once dangerousness and the statutory conditions were established, life imprisonment was mandatory. The seriousness of this armed and persistent conspiracy, together with Liverpool’s high risk of causing serious harm, justified a life sentence.
3. An extended sentence would not adequately protect the public. The psychiatric and probation evidence showed that Liverpool’s future risk and the connection between his illness and offending required assessment over time. The court therefore could not conclude that an extended sentence would suffice.
4. The judge had correctly treated the intended killing as a Level 1 offence by analogy with the attempted murder guideline. However, there was no evidence that the intended victim had suffered physical or psychological harm. The appropriate Level 1 starting point was therefore 15 years, not 20 years. A limited allowance for Liverpool’s mental illness produced a notional determinate term of 13 years. His minimum term was reduced to four years and eight months from sentence, and his concurrent sentence for conspiracy to rob to seven years. Completion of the minimum term did not require release; release remained for the Parole Board to determine by reference to safety.
5. Bradshaw’s low intellectual capacity, mental illness and subordinate role as Liverpool’s foot soldier warranted a substantial reduction. His sentence for conspiracy to murder was quashed and replaced with 10 years’ imprisonment, with a concurrent five-year sentence for conspiracy to rob.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — in [2014] EWCA Crim 1001, the court allowed both appeals against sentence to the stated extent, while retaining Liverpool’s life sentence.
• Exeter Crown Court — following a jury trial, both appellants were convicted on 3 April 2013 of conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to rob. Liverpool was sentenced that day; Bradshaw was sentenced on 9 July 2013.