P, R. v

A juror is not disqualified merely because professional experience gives that juror knowledge or expertise relevant to the subject matter of the trial. In the absence of personal knowledge of the case or a connection with those involved, a fair-minded and informed observer would expect the juror to decide solely on the evidence.

A discretionary life sentence requires both a very serious offence and good grounds for believing that the offender may present a serious danger to the public for an indeterminate period. Sentencing under the post-amendment regime also requires the necessary findings, including dangerousness. A sentence must rest on the conduct and period charged in the indictment. Sentences, and corrections to sentencing errors, must be pronounced openly in court.

The applicant was convicted at Lewes Crown Court of numerous sexual offences, including rapes of his wife and a male complainant, and offences concerning indecent images of children. He received two life sentences, with a minimum term of 24 years, and concurrent sentences on other counts.

His proposed conviction appeal concerned a juror who was an experienced child-protection social worker and professionally knew a police officer mentioned in evidence. The juror had no knowledge of the case or its facts.

The sentence appeal concerned the availability of life or extended sentences across offences committed before and after changes to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. It also raised whether the sentencing judge had relied on offending outside the periods charged and had failed to sentence four counts.

1. Conviction appeal. The application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused. The juror had responsibly disclosed her professional connection with a police officer and her potential access to records, but had no personal knowledge of the case, parties or facts. Her work experience in child protection did not itself give rise to apparent unconscious bias.

   A jury is selected from the community and properly brings its collective experience to the evaluation of evidence. Like a judge, each juror must decide the case on the evidence. Professional expertise relevant to the subject matter is not a ground for disqualification without a connection or knowledge capable of creating apparent bias.

2. Life sentences. Leave to appeal against sentence was granted and the appeal was allowed. For the rape of the wife, the conditions for a discretionary life sentence, as summarised in Attorney General's Reference No 32 of 1996 (R v Whittaker) [1997] 1 Cr App R(S) 261, were not satisfied. A very serious offence alone was insufficient; there also had to be sound grounds for an unquantifiable continuing danger to the public.

   For the later rape, the judge had not carried out the required analysis under the amended Criminal Justice Act 2003 or made a finding of dangerousness. In the circumstances, it would have been unfair, unsafe and unjust for the Court of Appeal to make that finding for the first time. The Crown had failed to give the judge the necessary assistance on the complex sentencing regimes.

3. Substituted sentence. The judge had taken an unjustifiably severe view by treating the male complainant as a sexual slave for four years, although the indictment covered two years and the rapes occurred only after he had reached 16. Taking account of the totality of the offending, the court quashed both life sentences. It substituted 20 years' imprisonment for the rape of the male complainant and a concurrent eight-year sentence for the rape of the wife. The other concurrent sentences remained, and time on remand was to count.

4. Open sentencing. The judge had omitted sentences on four counts. The court stated that any such error must be corrected by pronouncing the sentences in open court. Imprisonment must be imposed openly and transparently.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2014] EWCA Crim 1221, refused leave to appeal against conviction but granted and allowed the sentence appeal. It quashed the two life sentences and substituted concurrent determinate sentences, producing a total term of 20 years less time on remand.
• Crown Court at Lewes: The applicant was convicted on 31 May 2013 of multiple sexual offences and offences concerning indecent images. He received life sentences for two rape counts, with a minimum term of 24 years, and concurrent sentences on other counts.