Jones & Ors, R, v

A tribunal’s criticism of an expert witness’s objectivity in unrelated proceedings is not evidence of bad character unless it establishes misconduct, including reprehensible behaviour, within the Criminal Justice Act 2003. A mere preference for another expert’s evidence will ordinarily be irrelevant unless it bears materially on the reliability of the expert evidence at trial.

An acquittal of one alleged conspirator does not make another defendant’s conviction unsafe where the evidence supports participation in a conspiracy with other persons and knowledge of their intended roles. In sentencing a prolonged, sophisticated and large-scale conspiracy to defraud mortgage lenders, the scale, persistence, greed, abuse of trust and exposure of nominees to debt may justify a sentence near the statutory maximum.

Following a four-month trial at Mold Crown Court, five defendants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud mortgage lenders through a scheme that used inflated property valuations and false mortgage applications to finance a substantial buy-to-let portfolio.

Jones, the conveyancing solicitor, appealed against conviction after the trial judge excluded evidence of a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal finding concerning the prosecution conveyancing expert. Susan Lowry-Huws appealed on the basis that the acquittal of one surveyor made her conviction unsafe. Antony Lowry-Huws and Whalley appealed against sentence, and Lowry-Huws also sought an extension of time to appeal his conviction.

1. The court dismissed the appeals against conviction. The proposed evidence concerning the prosecution expert was not evidence of bad character under sections 98 and 112 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The disciplinary tribunal had preferred another expert’s evidence and expressed concern about the expert’s objectivity in the circumstances of that case. It had not found reprehensible behaviour. In any event, the material was at most peripherally relevant and could not affect the safety of Jones’s conviction: the expert had made appropriate concessions at trial, and the tribunal material did not bear on whether the scheme was a sham known by Jones to be such.
2. Susan Lowry-Huws’s conviction was safe. Her participation did not depend on a conspiracy with the acquitted surveyor. A conspirator need not deal personally with every other conspirator. It was sufficient that she joined the enterprise knowing the kind of roles others would perform. The jury could properly conclude from the uncontradicted evidence that she knowingly participated with her husband and Jones in a fraud on the mortgage lender.
3. Antony Lowry-Huws’s sentence of seven years was not manifestly excessive. The conspiracy endured for more than four years, targeted lenders on a very large scale, was motivated by greed, exploited innocent nominees and created substantial foreseeable losses. Against the ten-year maximum for conspiracy to defraud under section 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, the sentence proportionately reflected the gravity of the offending.
4. Whalley’s sentence was reduced from six years to five years. Later material showed both her sustained wish to make reparation and that imprisonment imposed an unusually heavy burden because of her husband’s grave illness and her caring responsibilities. Those factors warranted a further reduction despite the absence of an early admission of guilt.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2014] EWCA Crim 1762, the court dismissed the conviction appeals of Jones and Susan Lowry-Huws, refused Antony Lowry-Huws’s renewed application for an extension of time to appeal conviction, dismissed his sentence appeal, and allowed Whalley’s sentence appeal by reducing her sentence to five years.
• Mold Crown Court: On 6 and 7 June 2013, a jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to defraud following a trial before His Honour Judge Rhys Rowlands.