Cojan, R. v

There is no absolute rule preventing prosecuting counsel from making a closing speech merely because an accused is unrepresented. The controlling question is whether allowing the speech is fair in all the circumstances. The trial judge must protect the accused’s right to a fair trial and should consider the history of representation, the reason for self-representation, the issues in the case, and counsel’s duty of fairness.

A judge may properly advise an unrepresented accused about the adverse consequences of introducing character evidence. A conviction will remain safe where the evidence as a whole provides no proper basis for doubt.

The applicant was convicted at Leeds Crown Court of four offences of rape and two offences of robbery. He had dismissed his legal representatives shortly before the summing-up, declined replacement representation, and conducted the remainder of the trial himself. The complainants’ identities were protected under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.

He renewed an application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal against conviction. He contended that the trial was unfair because prosecuting counsel made a closing speech while he was unrepresented, and because he had been prevented from calling character evidence. The central issues were whether either matter rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. The Court refused both the application for an extension of time and the renewed application for leave to appeal. The convictions were safe.

2. The former convention that prosecuting counsel should not make a closing speech where an accused is unrepresented did not impose an inflexible prohibition. The Court endorsed the modern approach indicated in Stovell [2006] EWCA Crim 27 and declined to adopt a rule that could permit an accused strategically to dismiss representatives in order to prevent a prosecution speech. The overriding question is whether permitting the speech is fair in the circumstances.

3. It is the trial judge’s duty to secure a fair trial. Where an accused is unrepresented, the judge must assess all relevant circumstances before permitting prosecuting counsel to address the jury. Here, the applicant had been represented for most of the trial, chose to dispense with representation, and refused substitute lawyers. There was no basis to doubt that the judge and prosecuting counsel observed their respective duties of fairness.

4. The Court also independently reviewed the safety of the convictions. The two complainants made similar and independent allegations. Their accounts were supported by medical and scientific evidence, identification evidence, and material found in the applicant’s car. The evidence therefore provided no cause to doubt the convictions’ safety.

5. The complaint concerning character evidence was unarguable. The judge was entitled, and obliged, to ensure that the self-represented applicant understood that calling such evidence could allow the prosecution to reveal his past record. No identified witness statement or application was pursued, the proposal was late, and the applicant suffered no unfairness from the advice.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The applicant’s renewed applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal against conviction were refused in [2014] EWCA Crim 2512.

• Leeds Crown Court — The applicant was convicted on 8 August 2011 of four offences of rape and two offences of robbery. On 29 September 2011 he was sentenced to imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of eight years.