Ahmed, R v

An irregular disclosure concerning a jury’s progress does not, without more, render convictions unsafe. The question of apparent bias is objective: whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. Under article 6, the question is whether there are sufficient guarantees to exclude objectively justified doubts about impartiality.

Where there is no evidential link between jurors and persons publishing information hostile to defendants, and the jury’s conduct and verdicts demonstrate conscientious assessment of the evidence, the test is not met. An appellate court should also recognise that a trial judge cannot investigate the content of jury deliberations, but may investigate an alleged irregularity. In sentencing, concurrent terms may be increased under totality principles to reflect overall criminality.

The applicant was convicted at Liverpool Crown Court of conspiracy to engage in sexual activity with children, trafficking for sexual exploitation, rape, aiding and abetting rape, and sexual assault. He received concurrent sentences, including 19 years’ imprisonment for the rape counts.

During jury deliberations, internet posts by far-right organisations purported to reveal that guilty verdicts had been reached. The trial judge investigated, declined to discharge the jury, and the jury subsequently returned verdicts. On appeal, the Court directed the CCRC to investigate the source of the information.

The applicant renewed applications for permission to appeal conviction and sentence. The central issues were whether the postings established jury irregularity or apparent bias sufficient to make the convictions unsafe, and whether the rape sentences were manifestly excessive.

1. The renewed applications for permission to appeal conviction and sentence were refused. The CCRC investigation showed that extensive security arrangements made secret communications by jurors extremely difficult. The court could not infer that a juror deliberately disclosed deliberations. Although inaccurate prediction by guesswork was improbable, the later information about sentencing was more likely to have come from someone connected with the prosecution, defence, or interpreters.

2. It remained possible that inadvertent loose talk by a juror outside the jury room had disclosed the jury’s progress. That would be a jury irregularity. However, disclosure of progress on counts, considered alone, would not compromise jury independence or the ability to decide according to the evidence. It therefore did not make the convictions unsafe.

3. Applying the apparent-bias test in Re Medicaments [2001] 1 WLR 700, as amended by Porter v McGill [2002] 2 AC 357, the court asked whether a fair-minded and informed observer would see a real possibility of jury bias. It also applied the equivalent article 6 impartiality approach in Gregory v UK (1998) 25 EHRR 577 and Sander v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 44.

   There was no evidential link between any juror and the far-right organisations. The questionnaires, jury notes, mixed verdicts, and the judge’s observations all supported the conclusion that the jury had assessed the evidence conscientiously. No real possibility of bias, or objectively justified doubt about impartiality, arose.

4. The judge had made proper enquiries and could not investigate the content of deliberations. He was entitled not to discharge the jury and had given appropriate directions. The convictions were safe.

5. The 19-year concurrent rape sentences were within the guideline range for repeated rape. The use of alcohol, coercion, force, the victims’ vulnerability, and the connected conspiracy and trafficking justified a sentence at the top of the range under totality principles. The sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) The applicant’s renewed applications for permission to appeal conviction and sentence were refused: [2014] EWCA Crim 619.
• Liverpool Crown Court The applicant was convicted on 4 and 8 May 2012 and received concurrent sentences, including 19 years’ imprisonment for rape.