Uppal v Endemol UK Ltd & Ors

On an application to determine whether words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, the court applies the governing principle of reasonableness. A broadcast must be considered as a whole, including any immediate condemnation or explanation. Insults and abuse are not actionable unless they contain a defamatory imputation. The hypothetical reasonable viewer is not naïve or unduly suspicious and is taken to have the characteristics of the reasonable reader. A statement must affect reputation generally, rather than merely offend or damage the claimant in the eyes of a section of the public. Ridiculing a person is distinct from exposing that person to ridicule.

The claimant, a former Big Brother housemate, brought claims against the producer, broadcaster and a fellow housemate arising from two broadcasts. The claims included libel, breach of duty of care and breach of contract. The producer and broadcaster applied for a ruling that the words were incapable of bearing the pleaded meanings, were not defamatory, and for summary judgment on the defamation claim. They also sought further information about the remaining claims. The central issues were whether either broadcast was capable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meanings and whether further information should be provided.

1. Defamation application. The court applied the principles summarised in Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130. The reasonable viewer has the characteristics of the reasonable reader and is not avid for scandal or unduly suspicious. The broadcast must be read as a whole, including any “bane and antidote”.
2. The 25 June broadcast was incapable of meaning that the claimant had below-average intelligence, was socially or intellectually inferior, or was sexually promiscuous. The description of her as a “piece of shit” was vile abuse. The rap did not suggest that she would be a willing participant in the sexual activity referred to, and it might ridicule her without exposing her to ridicule. Big Brother’s condemnation also directed any reputational criticism towards the speaker, not the claimant.
3. The 19 July broadcast was incapable of meaning that the claimant was socially or intellectually inferior because of her Indian origin or descent. It constituted offensive racial stereotyping, but the reflection was on the speaker, who was then given a warning and appeared genuinely sorry, rather than on the claimant.
4. Neither broadcast was capable of bearing any defamatory meaning. The First and Second Defendants therefore obtained summary judgment on the defamation claim, which was dismissed.
5. The claimant was ordered to provide further information concerning the duty of care and contract claims by 4 pm on 22 April 2014. She was ordered to pay the First and Second Defendants’ costs of that application, with assessment to follow if required.