Rai & Ors v Ahir & Ors

Disputes within a religious association are justiciable where a member seeks enforcement of a civil or private right arising from the association’s constitution. The court may determine religious matters only so far as they are objectively ascertainable and necessary to resolve that civil issue. It must not decide the truth or reasonableness of religious doctrine, or act as an appellate body reviewing the wisdom of decisions made by the association’s governing organs.

Intervention is justified where a governing body has acted clearly and demonstrably beyond its constitutional powers, or where there has been a vital disconformity with the association’s constitution. A constitutional complaint procedure does not confer adjudicative powers on trustees without sufficiently express language. A clause purporting to exclude the court’s jurisdiction is void to that extent.

Six members of the Shri Guru Ravidass Sabha Southall brought charity proceedings against members of its Executive Committee and trustees. The dispute concerned a membership-registration notice published before delayed elections. An addendum stated that the Sabha’s religious Granth was the Shri Guru Granth Sahib, that no other holy book was endorsed, and that members had to believe in it.

The claimants alleged breaches of the Sabha’s constitution, custom and the duties of the Executive Committee and trustees. They also challenged the trustees’ failure to direct removal of the addendum. The central issues included whether the dispute was justiciable, whether the notice was ultra vires the constitution, and whether the trustees had power or a duty to adjudicate the complaint.

1. Justiciability. Applying Khaira v Shergill [2014] UKSC 33, the court held that the claim involved contractual rights arising from the Sabha’s constitution. It could therefore determine whether the Executive Committee had acted ultra vires, provided the issue was confined to objectively ascertainable matters. The court could not determine which religious faction was doctrinally correct or prescribe future worship.
2. Notice. The preferable construction of clause 2(a) was that it permitted worship in accordance with the product of research into the Holy Scriptures of Ravidass, without resolving whether any particular book represented that research. Read in the context of the Sabha’s established worship and the community’s knowledge of the controversy, the addendum did not impose a requirement clearly and demonstrably beyond the constitution. The complaint therefore fell short of the threshold identified in McDonald v Burns [1940] SC 376.
3. Custom and election provisions. Attorney-General v Pearson (1817) 3 Merrivale 353 did not establish that membership notices had to follow an established pattern. Clause 12(g) applied from the announcement of an election and fixing of its date until the handover to the new committee, but not to the earlier registration notice.
4. Trustees. Clause 8(d) did not impose a duty on the trustees to adjudicate complaints or empower them to direct the Executive Committee to act in a particular way. Its attempted exclusion of the court’s jurisdiction was void under Baker v Jones [1954] 1 WLR 1005. The claim was dismissed.