Tata Consultancy Services Ltd v Sengar

Interim mandatory relief may be granted where there is a serious issue to be tried, damages would not provide adequate protection, and the balance of convenience favours the order. The court may require delivery up of confidential material even where ownership of the physical documents is disputed.

For breach of confidence, the information must possess the necessary quality of confidence, have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, and have been used or threatened to be used without authorisation to the claimant’s detriment. A recipient may owe the obligation where a reasonable person would recognise the confidential character of the information. A mere allegation of public interest or wrongdoing does not justify disclosure.

The claimant, Tata Consultancy Services Ltd, sought interim orders against the defendant, Prashant Ashok Singh Sengar. The application concerned documents and electronic information allegedly obtained from Tata’s confidential internal system.

Tata sought delivery up, preservation and deletion of the material, together with injunctions restraining disclosure, use, or procurement of further confidential information. Mr Sengar relied on the material in connection with threatened discrimination, contractual and immigration-related complaints, and asserted a public-interest justification for retaining or disclosing it.

The central issues were whether the mandatory and prohibitory injunction tests were satisfied, whether the information was confidential, and whether the asserted public-interest and freedom-of-expression arguments prevented relief.

1. Interim relief. Applying American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd and Nottingham Building Society v Eurodynamics Systems, there was a serious issue to be tried and Tata had a real prospect of establishing a right to permanent relief. Damages would not adequately compensate Tata for the difficulty of quantifying loss if the information reached competitors or headhunters. Mr Sengar would be adequately protected by Tata’s undertaking in damages.
2. The least risk of injustice lay in ordering delivery up. Once confidential information is disclosed it cannot readily be retrieved. The material was therefore to be held by Tata’s solicitors pending trial or further order. The order was also justified under section 4 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, CPR 25.1(1)(e), CPR 25.1(c)(i), and the court’s inherent jurisdiction. That jurisdiction applied even if the physical documents ultimately belonged to Mr Sengar.
3. Breach of confidence. The three elements identified in Coco v A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd were satisfied for interim purposes: the information had the necessary quality of confidence; it was imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and there was at least an arguable unauthorised use and a real risk of further disclosure to Tata’s detriment.
4. The information was restricted to Tata personnel, password-protected, and included employee and client information. Its confidential character did not depend on an express label. A recipient may be bound where he knows, or a reasonable person would know, that the information was disclosed in breach of a duty of confidence.
5. Mr Sengar’s assurances were insufficient in light of his emails referring to disclosure to the media and to others seeking the information. The alleged whistleblowing justification was weak. The evidence did not establish the conditions relied on under sections 43G and 43H of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and any public interest in disclosure was outweighed by the public interest in preserving confidentiality.
6. The orders restraining communication, disclosure and procurement of further confidential information were granted. Deletion of retained electronic copies was also appropriate. The court declined at that stage to require disclosure of the source’s identity, adopting a proportionate staged approach under which Tata could return to court if necessary.

First-instance interim injunction application. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.