DK, R (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration detention is unlawful where the Secretary of State fails lawfully to apply the detention policy concerning serious mental illness which cannot be satisfactorily managed in detention. The policy must be construed purposively and applied through orthodox, flexible Tameside principles. The duty is to make reasonable and proportionate inquiries in the circumstances, not routinely to obtain complete medical records or an independent psychiatric report. A diagnosis of serious mental illness does not itself engage the policy. The relevant question is whether the illness can be satisfactorily managed in detention. A failure to conduct the mandatory medical examination required by rule 34 of the Detention Centre Rules renders detention unlawful because the examination bears on the decision to detain, although causation remains relevant to compensatory damages. Knowledge or public-law errors of detention healthcare staff are not automatically imputed to the Secretary of State.

The claimant, a Turkish national and foreign national offender, was detained under immigration powers following the expiry of a custodial sentence and the making of a deportation order. He claimed damages for false imprisonment and under the Human Rights Act 1998, alleging that the Secretary of State failed to apply Chapter 55.10 of the Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, failed to make proper inquiries about his mental health, breached rules 34 and 35 of the Detention Centre Rules, and violated Articles 3 and 8 ECHR.

The detention lasted from December 2010 until release on bail in October 2011. The court considered the detention in two periods, the evidence available at the relevant times, the effect of later psychiatric evidence, the rule 34 examination requirement, causation, and whether healthcare staff’s knowledge or errors could be attributed to the Secretary of State.

1. Outcome. The claim was dismissed. The claimant’s detention was unlawful between 21 December 2010 and 1 February 2011 because no rule 34 examination was conducted within 24 hours of admission to Harmondsworth IRC. That breach was non-causative, since the later examination did not produce a rule 35 referral and the claimant would have been detained in any event. He was therefore entitled only to nominal damages on that issue, but the claim for damages was dismissed as framed.
2. Chapter 55.10 and Tameside. The phrase “serious mental illness which cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention” must be considered as a whole. A diagnosis of serious mental illness is insufficient. The threshold is whether the illness is sufficiently serious that it cannot be satisfactorily managed in detention, having regard to medication, available facilities and the detainee’s demonstrated needs. The Secretary of State must make reasonable inquiries, but the duty is context-specific and proportionate. It does not require a routine trawl of confidential records or a fresh independent psychiatric report whenever mental illness is possible.
3. The court adopted the orthodox approach in R (Das) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 45. The Secretary of State may generally rely on responsible clinicians after reasonable inquiries, provided she does not abdicate her own public-law responsibilities. On the evidence available at the relevant times, the claimant’s condition was capable of satisfactory management in detention and was in fact adequately managed. Chapter 55.10 was therefore never engaged.
4. Rule 34. Rule 34 required a physical and mental examination by a medical practitioner within 24 hours of admission. A nurse’s routine healthcare induction was not a rule 34 examination, and rules 34 and 35 were cumulative rather than alternative. Following R (EO) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 1236 (Admin), the breach bore on the detention decision and made detention unlawful without proof of causation. Causation remained relevant to the amount of damages.
5. Imputation and hindsight. Public-law errors or healthcare knowledge could not automatically be imputed to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State was generally entitled to rely on responsible medical professionals and on the system established by the Detention Centre Rules. The lawfulness of detention had to be assessed on the information reasonably available at the time; later evidence and hindsight could not retrospectively invalidate the decision.
6. The Article 3 and Article 8 claims failed. The evidence did not establish the high threshold for Article 3 or a failure to maintain a proper healthcare system under Article 8. The claimant’s claims were dismissed, with costs subject to the stated legal-aid protections.

First-instance judicial review and damages claim in the Administrative Court. The court dismissed the claims and ordered the claimant to pay the defendant’s costs subject to applicable costs-protection provisions.