ID & Ors v The Home Office

An immigration officer has no immunity from liability for false imprisonment where the decision authorising detention is unlawful. A material public law error may take the decision outside the powers conferred by the Immigration Act 1971. False imprisonment is a tort of strict liability, and neither bad faith nor a prior quashing order is required.

Claims for damages alone may be brought by ordinary action, even though their determination requires examination of an administrative decision. Short detention under the Oakington examination process was lawful on the pleaded case. The legality and proportionality of continued family detention after examination could, subject to a further hearing, require trial. Fact-sensitive claims under articles 2 and 3 should not be summarily dismissed where disclosure and oral evidence may materially affect their resolution.

The claimants were a Czech Roma family who sought asylum on arrival in the United Kingdom. The father was initially detained separately. The family was then detained at Oakington, Yarl’s Wood and Harmondsworth. While they were at Yarl’s Wood, a serious disturbance and fire occurred, from which they escaped with the assistance of other detainees.

They brought county court claims including false imprisonment and breaches of articles 2, 3, 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. District Judge Lightman refused the Home Office’s strike-out and summary judgment application. Judge Crawford Lindsay QC allowed the Home Office’s appeal and substantially extinguished those claims.

The Court of Appeal considered whether immigration officers enjoyed immunity for unlawful detention decisions, whether damages had to be pursued through judicial review, whether the different periods of detention were arguably unlawful, and whether the Convention claims had a real prospect of success.

1. Appeal allowed in part, unanimously, subject to a further hearing. The order below was set aside insofar as it extinguished the potentially viable claims concerning post-Oakington false imprisonment and article 5 compensation, the article 2 claim concerning Yarl’s Wood, and the article 3 claims concerning Yarl’s Wood and Harmondsworth. The matter was remitted to the county court.

2. An immigration officer who authorises detention is the relevant first actor. Authority protects those who implement an apparently lawful direction, but it does not protect the officer if the authorisation itself was unlawful. A decision affected by a material public law error is outside the powers conferred by Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. Parliament had not conferred immunity on immigration officers whose decisions were nullities. The court was not bound to follow Mohammed Ullah v Home Secretary because later authority, particularly R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p Evans (No 2), had clarified the strict protection given to personal liberty.

3. False imprisonment is a tort of strict liability. Once imprisonment is established, the person responsible must justify it as lawful. Good faith, reasonable care or the absence of an improper motive does not justify an unlawful executive detention. A claimant need not first obtain judicial review, a declaration or a quashing order.

4. A private law damages action was procedurally proper even though it required scrutiny of an administrative decision. The Administrative Court could not entertain a claim for damages alone. Ordinary civil courts could apply public law principles and manage any need for specialist Administrative Court expertise.

5. The Home Office was entitled to summary judgment concerning detention through the end of the family’s stay at Oakington. In light of R (Saadi) v Home Secretary [2002] UKHL 41, the pleaded challenge to short detention within the Oakington examination process had no real prospect of success.

6. The continued detention after Oakington potentially raised different questions about absconding risk, the imminence of removal, internal policy, the detention of children, the suitability of the detention centres and proportionality under article 5. The court required a further short hearing after receiving the immigration officer’s authorisation form before deciding whether those claims should be reinstated.

7. The article 2 claim concerning Yarl’s Wood and the article 3 claims concerning Yarl’s Wood and Harmondsworth were fact-sensitive and arguable. They should proceed alongside the negligence claim so that disclosure and, where necessary, cross-examination could occur. The free-standing article 8 claim had no real prospect of success and remained dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was allowed in part, subject to a further hearing. The court restored the potentially viable post-Oakington false imprisonment and article 5 claims and the claims under articles 2 and 3, while leaving the dismissal of the Oakington and free-standing article 8 claims undisturbed. The matter was remitted to the county court.
2. Central London County Court, Judge Crawford Lindsay QC: Allowed the Home Office’s appeal and granted strike-out or summary judgment concerning the false imprisonment and articles 2, 3, 5 and 8 claims.
3. Central London County Court, District Judge Lightman: Struck out the Home Office’s application to strike out the claims or obtain summary judgment.