Hamaizia & Anor v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

In determining the meaning of allegedly defamatory words, the court must identify one single meaning by applying the governing principle of reasonableness. The words must be read as a whole and in their publication context, including any relevant features of the intended readership. The court must avoid strained interpretations, but is not required always to adopt the least derogatory meaning. A prominent headline may be neutralised by the body of an article where the publication, read as a whole, makes the true position sufficiently clear. The court may determine a meaning not pleaded by either party. In this case, the publication did not allege that the claimants were murderers or involved in the murder itself. Its meaning was that they had been imprisoned for offences committed during their involvement in the lead-up to the murder.

The claimants brought a libel claim against the Metropolitan Police concerning a press release headed “Three jailed for murder of Marvin Henry”. They contended that the publication meant that they had been involved with four others in the murder and had been imprisoned for that involvement. The defendant contended that the publication referred only to their convictions for false imprisonment and grievous bodily harm in connection with events preceding the murder.

The issue was a preliminary determination of the single actual meaning of the words complained of, read in their full publication context. A previous ruling by Tugendhat J, [2013] EWHC 848 (QB), had held that the words were incapable of meaning that either claimant was guilty of murder.

1. Single meaning. The court applied the principle stated in Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157 that words sued on in libel must bear one ascertainable legal meaning.
2. Reasonable reader and context. The criteria in Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 13 were applied. The court considered the hypothetical reader to be an ordinary reasonable journalist: educated and professionally familiar with written English, but not disposed to analyse the publication as a lawyer or to select an unduly suspicious meaning. The intention of the publisher was irrelevant, and the press release had to be read as a whole.
3. Degree of derogation. The court applied McAlpine v Bercow [2014] EMLR 3. The least derogatory meaning is not automatically selected where a more serious meaning is what the reasonable reader would understand in the circumstances.
4. Publication as a whole. Following Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65, the headline could not be isolated from the body of the press release. The names of the murderers, their life sentences, and the separate offences and sentences of the claimants made it clear that the claimants had not been convicted of murder. The opening reference to involvement in the lead-up to the murder was decisive in resolving the later, condensed reference to involvement in the murder.
5. The earlier press releases were not part of the relevant context. It could not generally be inferred that the same individual journalists, rather than merely the same organisations, would have read and remembered publications issued four months earlier.
6. The court therefore held that the words meant that each claimant had been imprisoned for six years for grievous bodily harm and false imprisonment committed during involvement in the lead-up to Marvin Henry’s murder. Written submissions were invited on consequential orders.

This was a first-instance determination of a preliminary issue. The judgment records an earlier ruling by Tugendhat J dated 17 April 2013, [2013] EWHC 848 (QB), concerning meaning and abuse of process. The present court determined the amended meaning issue.