Archer, R (On the Application Of) v Odgers

Judicial review is ordinarily unavailable where Parliament has created a comprehensive statutory appeal scheme capable of determining the dispute. This applies particularly where the challenge concerns the merits, factual assessment or calculation of child maintenance. Exceptional circumstances may justify judicial review, including an alternative remedy that is materially less effective or convenient, or an abuse of power. A defective decision letter does not necessarily justify judicial review where subsequent clarification provides an informed opportunity to appeal. An agency must consider information properly supporting a supersession, even where a recent tribunal decision remains relevant. Whether that information justifies a changed calculation is ordinarily a matter for the specialist fact-finding tribunal.

The claimant sought judicial review of three decisions reducing child maintenance payable by the interested party. She alleged, among other matters, illegality, irrationality, fettering of discretion, failure to consider relevant matters, breach of legitimate expectation and unfairness.

The decisions followed a First-tier Tribunal determination that the interested party had diverted income and that specified assets should be treated as generating income. The claimant did not appeal the later decisions to the First-tier Tribunal, although she knew of that right and accepted that she would receive a fair hearing. The central issue was whether judicial review should nevertheless proceed despite the statutory appeal route.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Child Support Act 1991 created a discrete statutory scheme, including a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against decisions to make, revise or supersede a maintenance calculation. The Tribunal could extend the ordinary one-month appeal period in appropriate circumstances.
2. The respondent was required to consider the information supplied in support of the proposed supersession. The recent First-tier Tribunal decision did not prevent consideration of new information, including financial material relating to a different tax year and evidence of a dividend. The respondent was entitled to apply the ordinary statutory calculation process and there was no obligation to refer the matter to another unit or department.
3. The claimant's substantive complaints concerned the sufficiency of the evidence, the factual assessment and the treatment of assets. Those matters were pre-eminently for the First-tier Tribunal, which was the specialist fact-finding body. The Administrative Court could not determine the merits of the maintenance calculation on judicial review.
4. The first decision letter was inadequate and confusing. However, the subsequent telephone explanation gave the claimant the relevant calculation information and confirmed her appeal rights. She faced no comparable prejudice or procedural risk to that identified in R (on the application of) C v Financial Services Authority [2012] EWHC 1417 (Admin).
5. The principle that judicial review is a remedy of last resort applied. Following Falmouth v Truro Port Health Authority [2001] QB 445 and Townsend v Department of Work and Pensions [2012] EWCA Civ 1711, only exceptional circumstances justified departure from the statutory appeal route. The claimant's choice not to appeal, and the later expiry of some appeal periods, did not create such circumstances.
6. The court expressed concern about the decision to disregard the yacht purchased with the proceeds of shares previously treated as an asset. Whether that involved an unreasonable and intentional deprivation of income was nevertheless a factual issue for the tribunal, not a basis for the court to determine the merits.
7. The claim therefore failed. The defendant was entitled to costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

First instance judicial review. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.