Luckwell v Limata

Nuptial agreements must be given weight in the discretionary exercise under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The weight may range from slight to decisive, depending on factors including informed consent, disclosure, independent advice, reliance, children and the parties’ needs.

An agreement cannot be treated as a trump card. It may be overridden where adherence would leave one party in a predicament of real need while the other has a sufficiency or more, or would prejudice the reasonable requirements and welfare of children. Any departure should go no further than fairness requires, and may preserve the agreement by limiting the duration, ownership and structure of the award.

The wife and husband married after signing a pre-marital agreement under which the husband waived claims to the wife’s separate property and future family gifts. During the marriage they signed two supplemental agreements concerning substantial properties gifted to the wife by her parents. Each agreement was supported by disclosure and independent legal advice.

After an eight-year marriage and the birth of three children, the husband sought financial provision. The wife relied on the agreements and contended that they should lead to dismissal of his claims. The central issue was the weight to be given to the agreements under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, particularly in light of the husband’s housing needs, debts and role as father.

1. Public hearing. Rule 27.10 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 establishes a starting point that financial remedy proceedings are private. It creates no presumption that the proceedings must remain private. The question whether to sit in public is discretionary. The court directed that the proceedings be heard in public, having regard to open justice, transparency and the public interest in nuptial agreements.
2. Nuptial agreements. Applying Granatino v Radmacher [2010] UKSC 42, [2011] 1 AC 534, the court remained responsible for deciding what provision was fair under section 25. A freely entered agreement, made with full appreciation of its implications, should be given weight. Here the agreements received very great weight because they were repeatedly signed by a mature party after expert advice, with disclosure, and because the wife’s parents had relied upon them when making substantial gifts.
3. That weight did not make the agreements decisive. The husband had no home, no current meaningful income, substantial debts and no borrowing capacity. The wife had substantial capital, although largely tied up in the family home. The husband was therefore in a predicament of real need while the wife had a sufficiency. The children’s welfare also required the husband to have adequate accommodation in which they could visit and stay. The court rejected the submission that needs automatically trumped the agreements, but held that need could outweigh them in the circumstances.
4. The agreements were accordingly not applied literally. The wife was ordered to fund a property for the husband’s use, rather than ownership, with a larger housing fund until the youngest child reached 22 and a smaller lifetime home thereafter. She was also required to meet specified debts, tax, furnishing, transport and interim living costs. The structure preserved substantial weight for the agreements by restricting the husband’s access to capital and providing for reversion of part of the housing capital to the wife.
5. The court also held that a without-notice injunction under section 45(3) of the Family Law Act 1996 required a return date that was both convenient and just. A two-month delay was unjust in the circumstances.

First-instance decision. The judgment records no prior appellate decision in the same proceedings. See also [2014] EWHC 536 (Fam).