Norman v Norman

Financial remedy appeals in the Court of Appeal are ordinarily heard in public, with the parties named and the proceedings reportable. Anonymity or another reporting restriction requires cogent evidence that a derogation from open justice is strictly necessary.

The court must first determine whether article 8 rights are engaged. If they are, it must focus intensely on the competing rights, examine the justification for interfering with each, and apply proportionality. Neither article 8 nor article 10 has automatic precedence.

Privacy, distress, reputational harm or hostile reporting will rarely suffice without more. Protection of children or genuinely sensitive information may justify a proportionate restriction. Allegations of serious financial impropriety and matters already made public weigh strongly in favour of open reporting.

The wife applied to continue or replace anonymity orders previously made during prolonged financial remedy litigation with her former husband. The application concerned her proposed appeal from orders made by HHJ Raeside on 13 March 2015, including the dismissal of attempts to reopen historic financial orders and the imposition of a limited civil restraint order.

The media parties opposed anonymity. They relied on open justice and the public interest in reporting repeated challenges to financial orders and allegations of concealed assets. The husband remained neutral.

The Court of Appeal had already dismissed the anonymity application and discharged the earlier restrictions. The central issue was whether the wife had established that anonymity was necessary, having regard to articles 8 and 10 and the ordinary requirement that Court of Appeal proceedings be public.

1. The application for anonymity was dismissed unanimously. The earlier anonymity orders were discharged. Financial remedy appeals in the Court of Appeal are ordinarily heard in public, with the parties identified and the proceedings reportable. A restriction may be imposed only where cogent grounds establish that it is necessary for the proper administration of justice and no broader than strictly necessary.

2. Gloster LJ held that the court must first decide whether article 8 is engaged. If it is, the court must balance articles 8 and 10 by focusing intensely on the particular rights, considering the justification for interfering with each, and applying proportionality. Neither right has automatic precedence. Section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 does not give article 10 enhanced weight.

3. The wife’s article 8 rights were assumed, without decision, to be engaged to a limited extent. The relevant financial information was largely historic and principally concerned the husband. Distress caused by criticism, possible reputational harm and unsupported concern about employment prospects did not establish a sufficient privacy interest. The adult children were not involved in the issues, and there was no evidence that reporting would harm their rights.

4. The balance decisively favoured open reporting. The litigation raised legitimate public questions about repeated attempts to reopen financial orders, continuing maintenance, civil restraint and alleged concealment of assets. Serious allegations of financial impropriety strengthened the public interest in openness. Previous publication also made the practical value of anonymity doubtful.

5. Lewison LJ agreed and emphasised that the default position is a public hearing, identified parties and unrestricted reporting unless cogent reasons require departure. Financial remedy appeals differ from first-instance proceedings and from approval proceedings concerning children or protected parties. Pain, humiliation, privacy and hostile press coverage will rarely suffice alone, although children’s interests or sensitive personal information may justify protection.

6. The court did not determine the proper general approach to privacy or reporting at first instance under the Family Procedure Rules. The Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926 provided no basis for anonymisation because it expressly permits publication of parties’ names; its wider application to financial remedy proceedings was left unresolved.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The wife’s anonymity application was dismissed and earlier anonymity restrictions were discharged. Her application for permission to appeal was also dismissed, with reasons to be given separately.
2. Family Court at Guildford: On 13 March 2015 HHJ Raeside dismissed applications seeking to reopen the parties’ historic financial orders, struck out other applications as totally without merit, imposed a limited civil restraint order and ordered the wife to pay costs.