Castle v Crown Prosecution Service

Section 14 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 permits temporary restrictions on road use subject to conditions considered necessary, including variable speed limits operating at different times and places. The Carltona principle permits a Secretary of State to act through authorised departmental officials and an agency that is his alter ego, where he remains constitutionally accountable for its actions. That principle applies both to setting restrictions under an order and to making the order as a statutory instrument exercising an executive power. An order signed by an authorised official may therefore be treated in law as made by the Secretary of State.

The appellant was convicted by a deputy district judge of driving at 59 mph on the M62 in breach of a 50 mph restriction imposed under the M62 Motorway (Junction 25 to Junction 30) (Temporary Restriction and Prohibition of Traffic) Order 2011. By way of case stated, he challenged the conviction on four grounds. He argued that the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and the Order did not authorise variable speed limits, and that the Order was ultra vires because it was signed and operated by Highways Agency officials rather than personally by the Secretary of State. The central issues were whether the statutory power and Order authorised differential speed limits, and whether the Carltona principle applied.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The court answered all four questions posed by the deputy district judge in the negative for the appellant.
2. Section 14(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 confers a wide power to restrict road use, subject to conditions or exceptions considered necessary. Read with section 14(4), it is wide enough to authorise variable speed restrictions. Articles 3 and 6 of the 2011 Order clearly enabled 50 mph or 60 mph restrictions to operate at times indicated by traffic signs.
3. The setting of the applicable speed restriction was an administrative act lawfully performed by the Highways Agency on behalf of the Secretary of State. Under the Carltona principle, officials within a department, and an agency which is its alter ego, may exercise the Secretary of State’s statutory responsibilities where the Secretary of State remains accountable to Parliament. The Highways Agency’s Framework document established that relationship.
4. The Order itself stated that it was made by the Secretary of State. Mr Lee’s signature on his behalf did not establish that the Secretary of State had not made it. The appellant produced no evidence rebutting the presumption that the Order was validly made.
5. Alternatively, the power to make the Order was an executive power delegated to the Secretary of State, although exercised through a statutory instrument. The Carltona principle could therefore apply to the making and signing of the Order. King Emperor v Sarma and Others [1945] AC 14 concerned a different situation and did not support the appellant’s argument.
6. Mr Justice Cranston added that the Order was subject to statutory instrument procedures, publication and possible parliamentary and judicial scrutiny. Any wider concern about democratic accountability was a matter for Parliament.

• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal by way of case stated and affirmed the conviction.
• Magistrates’ court: the deputy district judge convicted the appellant of driving in breach of the temporary speed restriction.